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4ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the relationship between the policy regime and
growth during 1950-64 termed here ‘the Nehru era’. While there exist
valuable early appraisals of the period, access to new data and fresh
information allows for a longer and comparative view of the outcome.
We find overwhelming evidence not only of resurgent growth but also
of a lasting transformation of a stagnant colonial enclave into an economy
with  firmer foundations capable of sustained growth. It is useful to
recognise the economic policy of this period as distinct, not only from
what preceded it but also from what came after, for that  facilitates an
understanding of the political conditions needed for economic
interventions which  are growth inducing. The paper also addresses some
lingering perceptions of the economic policy of the time, notably its
impact on agriculture and the governance of the public enterprises. The
shibboleth ‘Hindu rate of growth’, presumably a broad-brush description
of movement in this period, manages to obscure the extraordinary
economic dynamics of the Nehru era.
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5Every individual is “… led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently
promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends
to promote it.”
Adam Smith: ‘An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations’
I. Introduction
It is a measure of the youthfulness of economics as a discipline that two
centuries after the appearance of the ‘Wealth of Nations’, considered a
landmark in its development, we are still asking the question ‘How do
economies grow?’1 . While the awareness of such candid self-scrutiny
may be flattering to a practitioner of the dismal science, it does speak of
an unsettled issue at its core. This paper is a study of Indian economic
growth for the one and a half decades from the middle of the twentieth
century, a broad marker for the end of colonial rule. It is intended as a
response of a kind to the challenge posed. As the period of the study
coincides with Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership of India it would also serve
as an evaluation of his role in the career of its economy. Though the
latter can only be achieved here by implication it may yet be considered
of some value as the best-known studies2  of Nehru treat his involvement
in this space as of secondary importance. To anyone with a sense of the
1. See Scott (1997).
2. See, for example, Gopal (1975, 1979, 1984). It is also the case with popular
writing even when the verdict is  altogether favourable, for which, see the tribute
by Malhotra (2007).
6history of the time this must appear extraordinary. While neither a concern
with economic growth in India nor a study of the Nehru era per se would
require justification when taken on their own, their being considered
jointly may be considered unusual today. My reason for doing so I now
account for.
This narrative is being written at a time of some turbulence in the
world of economic ideas, a turbulence that could hardly even have been
anticipated about a decade ago. For the 1990s had appeared to be a final
turning point with respect to ideas about economic growth, a turn that
was largely driven by political events, the more far-reaching of which
had been the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, itself symbolic of the
differences between the two rivaling economic systems of the twentieth
century. Certainly in the western world, a fierce competition had been
unleashed for allegiance to one of either state-directedness or free markets
as the organizing principle underlying economic arrangements for a
society. The fact that to most intelligent observers this had always
appeared to be a false dichotomy made little difference to how the end
of the Cold War, following the implosion of the Soviet Union, was
interpreted in the language of economic ideas. The triumphalism among
those who had all along claimed the superiority of the market system
said it all. To add to all of this, the world was also globalizing, which
now meant markets on a global scale. In the immediate world of economic
policy this had led to the purveying of a ‘Washington Consensus’. This
was a set of prescriptions on economic policy and were intended to serve
as benchmark for the so-called ‘emerging market’ economies. The prefix
itself merely referred to the fact that the US was now the sole super
power and Washington, D.C. its capital. But ‘consensus’ was somewhat
of a misnomer – as we were to discover later – for the reference was
merely to the views held by the United States Treasury and the Bretton
Woods institutions over which the former has always wielded some
influence. All these, among the world’s most powerful economic bodies,
are based in Washington, D.C.  Of course, the irony of it all was not lost
7on the author3  of the expression who had titled the article where it had
appeared What Washington means by policy reform, implying that there
was room for other interpretations. Williamson’s original listing of the
ingredients of a sound economic policy had contained: 1. Fiscal
discipline, 2. Re-orientation of public expenditures, 3. Tax reform, 4.
Financial liberalization, 5. Unified and competitive exchange rates, 6.
Trade liberalization, 7. Openness to foreign direct investment, 8.
Privatization, 9. Deregulation, 10. Secure property rights. Rodrik (2006)
has, somewhat helpfully, summarised this to read: “Stabilise, Privatise,
Liberalise”! While it may come across as somewhat of a caricature, it is
certainly the case that this brief agenda had had wide purchase in the
world of economic ideas in the middle of the nineteen nineties. In any
case, it is clear that the so-called consensus did not think much of state-
directedness, holding that policy is to be guided by what is best for the
free functioning of markets.
But it appears that a decade is a long time even in the sedate world
of economic ideas. Just when the Washington Consensus had appeared
to have settled in as the dominant framework, if not quite a paradigm,
there is now a ferment again with regard to economic policy. This ferment
in economic-policy (making) circles is well represented by the discussion
centred on a relatively recent document4  of the World Bank titled
‘Economic growth in the 1990s: Learning from a decade of reform’. In
a review of this report Dani Rodrik has stated that “… it is a rather
extraordinary document insofar as it shows how far we have come from
the Washington Consensus. There are no confident assertions here of
what works and what doesn’t – and no blueprints for policymakers to
adopt. The emphasis is in the need for humility, for selective and modest
reforms, and for experimentation. “the central message of this volume,”
….. the World Bank vice-president who oversaw the effort, writes in the
3. See Williamson (1990).
4. World Bank (2005).
8preface of the book, “is that there is no unique universal set of rules ….
[W]e need to get away from formulae and the search for ‘best practices’
…”. Occasionally, the reader has to remind himself that the book he is
holding in his hands is not some radical manifesto, but a report prepared
by the seat of orthodoxy in the universe of development policy.”5  Rodrik
sees the Report as a marker in the evolution of thinking about the route
to economic prosperity. He states that “Proponents and critics alike agree
that the policies spawned by the Washington Consensus have not
produced the desired results. The debate now is not over whether the
Washington Consensus is dead or alive, but over what will replace it.”6
Even as a leading economist, who has distinguished himself as a
commentator on development policy, has pronounced on the state of the
art many lines of investigation open up to us. However, I am firmly of
the belief that while the time is ripe for thinking beyond the formulaic
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, development policy – at
least for India where much has been attempted for close to half a century
- must be at least partly guided by experience. It is from such a perspective
that I revisit the relation between growth and the economic regime during
the Nehru era of India’s recent economic history. The choice is motivated
by two considerations. The first is purely contextual in that it is guided
by the discussion I have engaged in so far. As far as economic policy is
concerned, nothing could be further from the spirit of the Washington
Consensus than the public policy of the time. The state-directedness that
had characterized it diverged sharply from the prescription that pride of
place be given to the market. Moreover, the policy had unrelentingly
targeted growth, so by focusing on this aspect a policy is being judged
on its own terms. Secondly, the politics of the Nehru era had a certain
integrity to it, the term being used here in a strictly descriptive sense.
The distinctiveness to the politics of the period is that almost never since
5. Rodrik (2006), pp. 974-75.
6 . Rodrik, ibid, p. 973.
9has the leadership of India been able to maintain as much autonomy
from sectional interests. In this sense the economic policy regime had
certain integrity at least in its conception, if not always in its
implementation. Unlike later, when within the same overall framework
of state directedness much of the intervention was merely rear-guard
action to maintain7  the political power of a ruling dispensation.
Complementing my case for revisiting the experience of growth
in the Indian economy of the Nehru era is a shard of evidence that comes
from an altogether different debate from the one initiated by Rodrik.
This is entirely empirical and altogether Indian in its boundaries of
relevance, but it makes it no less striking in the context. Apparently finding
excessive the focus on the last two decades of the twentieth century as
the site for the sighting of the hand on the throttle, Hatekar and Dongre
(2005) have cast their net wider, taking on the entire twentieth century
when they search for a shift in the growth of GDP. It may come as surprise
to some that the most significant break of the century is found to be in
1950. Now it becomes obvious to enquire what it is about mid-20th
century India that marks it out as a watershed as far as economic growth
in India is concerned. As we know that post-colonial economic policy
had aimed to make a break from the immediate past, one is led naturally
to look at public policy and economic growth in the Nehru era. This
may be expected to serve two purposes. First, as it clearly marks a growth
transition, we get an idea of what factors drive growth. Secondly, as it
was also a period of high state-directedness, it enables us to assess how,
if at all, such intervention can facilitate growth and how it can hold it
back. The findings of such an exercise may be expected to have an
audience beyond those interested in the recent history of India. To that
extent it might indeed even end up contributing to the debate that Rodrik
has flagged off.
7. See Hankla (2006) for an examination of subsequent Indian economic policy
from such a perspective.
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II. Imagining economic growth: The Nehru-Mahalanobis Strategy
and its critics
Though narrowly identified as the model for the Second Five-Year Plan,
nothing is more iconic of the economics of the Nehru era and
representative of the means adopted to pursue its goals than the
Mahalanobis Model. The famed Model had first appeared in an essay8
on growth by the polymath. The model was intended to provide the
analytical foundation for the project of raising the level of income via
industrialisation already deliberated upon in the National Planning
Committee of the Congress which was chaired by Nehru at the request
of Subhash Chandra Bose in his capacity as the short-lived party
president. For this reason it is often referred to as the Nehru-Mahalanobis
Strategy9 . This was a model to serve the end of rapidly raising the level
of income through accelerating growth, as raising the level of income
was considered the means to eliminating poverty.
Mahalanobis had conceived of an economy with two sectors, each
producing capital and consumer goods, respectively. Being the model
of a closed economy without government, their outputs would thus sum-
up to gross domestic product or national income.The capital good enter
into the production of the consumer good and of itself. In an interesting
departure from the economic theory of the time, capital was not subjected
to diminishing returns. This implies that a greater initial allocation of
investment to the production of capital goods would leave the economy
with a higher stock of the same in the future. With these capital goods
being the physical counterpart of investment, a higher initial allocation
to capital goods production enables a higher investment in the future.
Assuming that all thus feasible investment is undertaken, a higher level
8. See Mahalanobis (1955). Most of Mahalanobis’s important writings on planning
are contained in Mahalanobis (1960).
9. Two contrasting interpretations of it may be noted, the “synoptic view” of
Chakravarty (1987) and the compleat deconstruction encompassing philosophy,
mathematics and empirical detail, by Srinivasan (1996).
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of investment – in the context no more than ‘putting (all of) the capital
good to work’ – is actualised. Now future-dated output is higher than
what would have been the case were the initial allocation skewed more
towards the production of consumer goods. Higher too would be the
rate of growth of the economy in relation to the starting point. Now the
planner’s problem is to arrive at the share of investment to be allocated
to the capital goods sector given the target level of income. I have here
provided a bare-bones description of the Model and its logic. However,
it is important when trying to understand the economic policy of the
fifties to recognize that, even for its architect, the Model was meant only
as a guide to a strategy for industrialisation. Therefore, it is equally
important to understand10  the practical aspects of the strategy as
manifested in what in the language of the day was referred to as ‘the
plan frame’.
At the heart of the Nehru-Mahalanobis Strategy was a fast growing
‘heavy goods’ sector. What are these heavy goods? They have been aptly
described as “machine-building complexes with a large capacity for the
manufacture of machinery to produce steel, chemicals, fertilizer,
electricity, transport equipment, etc.”11  The means of bringing about a
fast-growing heavy-goods sector was to invest disproportionately in these
machine-building complexes. It was implicitly recognised that as the
sector was characterised by long gestation lags in the production of output
the rate of growth inherent in the Mahalanobis model would be lower in
the short-run than that which would result from a strategy of investing
disproportionately in consumer goods production. However, the long-
run rate of growth resulting from the Mahalanobis strategy of shifting
the investment allocation towards heavy goods would be a higher12 ,
even for the consumer goods sector, as it enhances productive capacity
10. I am indebted to K. Narayanan Nair for this distinction.
11. Joshi (1979).
12. Demonstrated by Mahalanobis via simulation experiments.
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across the economy. In a sense the underlying idea of the Model is a
kind of accounting. It estimates growth prospects based on current
investment allocation, and chooses the allocation that maximizes the
rate of growth for any given investment outlay. It is not entirely value-
free of course, in that it implicitly adopts a lower social rate of discount
than could have been the case. It has been castigated as having been
based on ideology13 . This criticism begins to make sense only when
one is told that the Model had been inspired by the Feldman model from
the Soviet planning literature, even though Mahalanobis has stated14
that he was not aware of the work of Feldman at the time of formulation
of his own model. Presumably, the criticism justifies itself by identifying
any choice based on the Soviet experience as ideological. However, in
the light of the quite spectacular expansion demonstrated by the Former
Soviet Union of that time such a criticism would be ideological of itself,
even though into the twenty-first century we were to have the hindsight
to deduce that whatever was happening there was not sustainable. In the
fifties, however, newly independent countries with ambition could hardly
have been faulted for aspiring to what the Soviets had achieved, namely
rapid industrialisation and the consequent increase in income within a
remarkably quick time. It is not as if the entirely compromised politics
of the Stalin regime, even without the gulag and the genocides, was
overlooked. Only that Nehru was clear that India would avoid them at
the cost of aiming at a lower rate of growth. It was clear that neither
forced collectivisation as a route to raising the agricultural rate of growth
or the suspension of democracy as a way of quelling dissent on the chosen
strategy were even conceivable to the Indian leadership. So a relevant
criticism of the strategy would only be of its economic logic and what it
leaves out rather than of its provenance. Here the comment by Desai
(2007) that Mahalanobis’ model has in it no unemployment, inflation or
13. For example, see Price (1967), and the interchange between Vasudevan (1968)
and Price (1968) that had followed.
14.  See the passage reproduced in Chakravarty (1987).
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balance of payments is far more to the point. But once again, it is
important to separate out the model from the strategy, and most of these
except perhaps inflation were addressed by Mahalanobis in his writings
on the Second Plan.
There was, however, a flaw in the model that is indeed related to
where it had originated but this is far from having been constituted by
ideology. As more or less an accounting scheme the Mahalanobis model
was exclusively a supply-side model. There was no recognition of a
possible demand constraint to capital accumulation and little scope for
slackening demand growth to subvert the growth process. A model based
on the purely physical relationship between inputs and outputs made
sense in the Soviet Union, the classical ‘command economy’ where
investment can be decreed by planners and enforced by commissars.
Not so in India with a ubiquitous private sector that invests only in
response to growing profits or its anticipation. Demand is now the
lubricant. In the command economy the surplus could be constantly re-
invested irrespective of market signals, thus maintaining a more or less
constant growth dynamic, at least for some time. In the language of
Growth Economics the savings are always invested, which since Keynes
we recognise as a fiction at least for a market economy which India
mostly was then. The only constraint to a seemingly endless growth in a
command economy would be a declining investible surplus, which of
course could also arise for entirely non-economic reasons such as political
disaffection. Something of this sort perhaps describes the decline and
fall of the Soviet economy after about five decades of rapid growth.
However, even as late as the nineteen sixties there was no inkling of any
impending  collapse. But again, it is important to draw the distinction
between model and plan as it were, and the plan did explicitly recognise
the role of demand as I shall demonstrate below.
While the hubris that the state could direct investment indefinitely
and at will within the economy appears to have carried away the planners
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of India, the criticism often encountered that they failed to recognise the
importance of agriculture is merely ill-informed judgement. I intend to
establish this. This is not so much as to rehabilitate the planners as much
as to establish that they may not have succeeded as much as they would
have liked, thus throwing some light on what should be done in India
today. This indeed is the one of the uses of history for the economist.
But before I turn to the role envisaged for agriculture within the Nehru-
Mahalanobis Strategy, I must consider what in the mind of some
constituted a plan for an alternative development for India and a serious
challenge to the Mahalanobis Plan. This was the plan presented by C.N.
Vakil and P.R. Brahmananda of the Bombay School. The centre-piece
of the Vakil-Brahmananda Plan was a ‘wage-goods sector’. An entrée
into what had gone on in the minds of these two economists is made
when we appreciate the reason for their scepticism regarding the relevance
of the Keynesian problematic15  for India. As recaptured by Brahmananda
in an interview more recently16  Keynesian unemployment assumes
`excess capacity’ including “stocks of wage goods and other circulating
capital” while in India “… unemployment of labour exists because supply
of labour wage goods to sustain labour as a cooperant factor with land
and labour is inadequate.” Note the self-consciously Classical
terminology, for when Brahmananda is pressed to name the wage goods
he chooses “corn and clothing”. He had gone on to list fourteen items
but we may rest with `foodgrains and textiles’. Essentially for Vakil and
Brahmananda the multiplier mechanism cannot work in the absence of
wage goods, and this led them to the proposition that employment cannot
expand without wage goods. “So you see, for these reasons, agricultural
development becomes fundamental. It has to be accorded priority
independent of whatever you posit for industry.” And again, an
15. Of course, this had already been queried by Rao (1952). Rao had been a graduate
student at Cambridge immediately prior to the publication of the General Theory
and is likely to have been au fait with its assumptions.
16 . See ‘Brahmananda’ in Balasubramanyan (2001).
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observation quite relevant for India fifty years later, “The service and
industry sectors cannot absorb more than a small proportion of the labour
force. The service sector is (more?) important, but services can be
expanded only with growing wage goods surpluses.”17
So what is the proper appraisal of the Vakil-Brahmananda Plan?
There can be no doubt that in focusing on unemployment they had honed
in on a key reality of India in the nineteen fifties. Also, the centrality
accorded to agriculture could not have been faulted.  However, the authors
of this plan appear to have underestimated the importance of capital
goods for raising agricultural production. There is the suggestion18  that
these could have been imported in return for the wage goods, but if
wage goods were scarce enough to limit the expansion of employment
in the first place it is not clear how easily a sufficient export surplus
could have been generated. This question precedes any proclivity to
‘export pessimism’. Next there is the question of competitiveness to be
reckoned with. The much vaunted sterling balances had been built up
during the War when India had supplied the Allied effort in a virtual
seller’s world market. These goods - being minor armaments, clothing
and equipment - would no longer have been demanded to anything like
the same extent after the War. As for the agricultural sector, the primary
source of wage goods, it had been unable to supply even the domestic
population adequately19  during the first fifty years of the twentieth
century. This apart there was also the question of the very availability of
capital goods to be purchased in the world market. This is convincingly
argued by Chibber: “In the years after the war, capital goods in the form
of plant and machinery were extremely scarce; not only did India not
have any capital goods industry to speak of, but imports from the
developed world were not on the near horizon, as European powers
17.  All quotes are as reported in Balasubramanyan (2001). Question mark is mine.
18.  See ‘Brahmananda’ in Balasubramanyan (2001).
19.  Evidence on this is to follow.
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embarked on the reconstruction of their own economies and because the
United States did not regard South Asia as a pivotal region. The problem
with plant and machinery was mirrored by the problems with raw
materials and intermediate goods, especially since, after partition, much
of the Indian cotton and raw jute was now in Pakistan. In both these
cases, businesses constantly called for the assistance of the state in
securing the requisite import of goods.”20  Far from being a tangential
comment on the credibility of the Vakil-Brahmananda Plan, recognition
of Indian export and import possibilities in the late forties is suggestive
of the prospects for an Indian economic development through trade based
on comparative advantage.
But the egregious absence in the wage-goods-led model is the
economist’s dues ex machine, the ‘engine of growth’. Some of this is
evident in Brahmananda’s assertion that “If the system is expanding and
you have a supply of food, people could stay in their homes and produce
wage goods.”21  This agreeable picture begs the source of demand for
the expansion in the macro economy. With hindsight, we can see that
the Vakil-Brahmananda model was Classical more than just in its
terminology, with employment determined in the labour market. There
is no autonomous investment function, which would imply that the
demand for labour as a derived demand gets determined in the goods
market -  independent of its price -  and, in the context of their framework,
independent of whether there is an adequate supply of wage goods. Of
course, prices could still rise in the absence of wage goods and this would
hold back the multiplier mechanism. However, as the unemployed are
surviving as it is, it is possible to exaggerate22  the degree to which the
20. Chibber (2003), p. 147.
21. From ‘Brahmananda’ in Balasubramanyan (2001).
22. See the response to Rao’s paper by Raj (1954), and a conceptualisation of how
macroeconomic  equilibrium is restored when aggregate demand expands in an
India-type economy by, the then remarkably young, Bhagwati (1956).
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expansion in output is curtailed following due to the expansion in
aggregate demand.
 It is possible to espy a strange symmetry between the Mahalanobis
and the wage-goods models with the former downplaying the importance
of capital goods and the later downplaying the importance of consumer
goods! In fact, in the Mahalanobis two-sector model per se the absence
of consumer goods cannot constrain output growth. However, once the
overall Mahalanobis strategy is taken into account, we find that its
oversight of a crucial ingredient for growth of the Indian economy -
namely consumer goods - is arguably less than that of what had been
projected as a rival, the underestimation of the importance of capital
goods by Vakil and Brahmananda. At least, Mahalanobis saw
industrialisation as an input into agricultural growth and industrialisation
was to be promoted by public investment. No serious scheme for
transformation of the wage goods sector appears in the Vakil-
Brahmananda Plan. But it is with respect to the crucial role of demand
in the sustained expansion of an economy that the Mahalanobis Plan
looks set to win us over. Explaining its logic even before the launching
of the Second Plan in 1956, Mahalanobis had this to say: “The basic
strategy is (now) clear. We create demand by a planned expansion of the
basic industries and of the social sector, that is, health, education, etc.
We meet the demand by a planned increase in the production of consumer
goods as much as possible in the small and household industries, and
the rest in factories. As both production and income increase, we divert
a portion of the increase in income for new investments again in a planned
manner to balance new demand by new production, and the process
continues. At each stage, we must be careful that the right quantity of
raw materials is available at the right time for production; and the right
quantity of consumer goods is available at the right time to meet the
demand.” Of course, we can see the heroic assumptions of physical
planning at work here – notably the question of planning without full
control of prices in a private enterprise economy - but at least on the
18
drawing board Mahalanobis’ plan had hung together a little better than
anything else that was on offer23  for India at that stage in history as it
demonstrated an eye for the big picture. Finally, and as an aside, one
might observe that critics of Indian economic policy in the fifties who
saw the Mahalanobis Plan as violative of economic freedoms due to its
reliance on controls24  are unlikely to have taken much comfort from the
Vakil-Brahmananda Plan as its authors had placed it squarely in the field
of planning. Indeed, once employment rather than output is targetted it
is difficult to conceive of re-allocation of labour without envisaging forced
migration, Brahmananda’s vision of cottage industry notwithstanding.
Direct force in shaping development was ruled out of court by Jawaharlal
Nehru who held firmly to the belief that the only kind of economic
progress worth having was ‘progress by consent’.
Returning to the question of agriculture, not only was Mahalanobis
acutely aware of its role in the scheme of things but he had incorporated
this awareness into his strategy, if not so fully into his model. He had
instantly recognised that in the nineteen fifties Indian agricultural growth
was severely constrained by the availability of the most basic kind of
industrial inputs. Thus agricultural growth was itself linked to
industrialisation even though the extent could have been debated; that
is, while brick and mortar was clearly essential, it is certainly not true
that aircraft and automobiles were. Nevertheless the suggestion of a role
for industrialisation in launching the transformation of Indian agriculture
is not so entirely far-fetched.  At this juncture I quote from the late Raj
Krishna an economist who having placed himself at an obtuse angle vis-
à-vis the establishment that had donned the Nehruvian mantle is unlikely
to have ever been in thrall to it. Yet he has stated: “In a subcontinental
23. Desai (1998) has evaluated the Vakil-Brahmananda Plan as an alternative to the
Mahalanobis. To be sure, there was also the Gandhian model of the self-sufficient
village economy, but it had been explicitly rejected by Nehru himself, and stood
no chance of being adopted by an almost entirely urban post-colonial leadership
of India.
24. Notably Shenoy (1955).
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economy with a very large market, abundant natural resources of every
kind, and vast reserves of unskilled and skilled manpower, the building
up of a strong and diversified capital-goods base was a historical necessity.
If today we can boast of a large measure of self-reliance, it is because
considerable capacity has been created in the metallurgical, mechanical,
chemical, power and transport sectors. These sectors are basic precisely
because they are equally indispensable for defence, for large-scale
consumer goods production, for small-industry development and rural
development. The technical linkages between agriculture and industry
are such that even a 4 percent rate of growth in agriculture is not possible
without a high rate of growth in industries which supply the input
requirements of a growing agriculture in the form of cement, bricks,
pipes, pumps, electric power generation and transmission equipment,
agricultural implements, diesel oil, fertiliser, pesticides, roads, vehicles,
etc. And a seven percent growth in industry is not possible without a
high rate of agricultural growth, because nearly half the modern industrial
sector either processes agricultural output or supplies agricultural
inputs.”25  Notice that the links conceived of between agriculture and
industry in India at that early stage of development were both rudimentary
and fundamental at the same time, and, for that very reason, recognition
of it would have been central to any serious growth strategy. It would be
difficult to credibly argue that the Nehru Mahalanobis Strategy had
ignored, by design or by default, these links. To emphasise, I quote26
from the Second Five-Year Plan document: “It was appreciated that, in
India, surplus is the key to industrialization. It is not only essential to
grow enough food and fibres for our own requirements but it is also
necessary to produce a surplus in the form of either industrial or food
crops. In India agriculture and manufacturing industries are completely
interlocked. Economic progress depends on the advance of both. Advance
of one step in agriculture would supply food and raw materials for
25. Raj Krishna (1982), p. 59.
26. From Mahalanobis (1960), p. 96.
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advance of one step in manufacturing industries which again, in its turn,
would speed up irrigation and increase the supply of fertilizers and
pesticides and help in the promotion of scientific research, which would
lead to further advances in agriculture.”
While the raising of the level of income is widely recognised as
the main objective of planning in the Nehru era Mahalanobis himself
was additionally engaged with another one, a feature that is not widely
known. This was to release India “permanently”27  from the balance of
payments constraint. Indeed, in his view this was the very logic of
planning for industrialisation. This feature is seldom recognised, but it
needs to be and when it is we are given an internal criterion, so to speak,
by which to judge the economic policy of the Nehru era. After all,
autonomy was at the core of the Nehruvian vision of economic
development, not to mention of post-colonial India, and nothing would
epitomise this more than a strong balance of  payments position. Indeed,
if an independent development was the objective this would never be
achieved if India were strapped permanently to a balance of payments
deficit. Having flagged this I return to the more recognisable objective
of the economic policy of the time, namely the accelerated growth of
income.
So a rapid increase in the level of income was the objective and
this was to be brought about via greater investment in heavy industry.
We have also seen that this was central to the plan for the transformation
of Indian agriculture, a process that would require increased industrial
inputs. But how was this to be resourced? The planners were fully aware
that the step-up in investment envisaged in the Second Five-Year Plan
was very substantial indeed. Indeed, in retrospect, they appear to have
had a better sense of the role of resources in a credible economic plan
than is found in the public discourse on growth today when the issue of
27. Mahalanobis (1960), p. 74.
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the ‘policy regime’ is given much too important a role. This is apparent
from two elements of the plan to raise the level of income. First, no
major foreign assistance was envisaged. This was in keeping with the
idea of an independent development, a project incompatible with
excessive reliance on foreign aid or, even, foreign direct investment.
Taking the Second Plan as a case, foreign assistance was put down at
less than 5 percent of total public expenditure in the proposed plan
budget28  for 1956-57 to 1960-61 even as the investment rate was to be
raised by over fifty percent from 7 to 11 percent of GDP. Of course,
what the actual achievement with respect to foreign savings was we shall
have occasion to study later. The second point to note is that the envisaged
contribution of the public enterprises was significant, revealing the Indian
state’s understanding of their role in the economy. The item ‘Additional
Taxes and Loans & Profits from State Enterprises’ along with the
“Contribution from the Railways’ together equaled ‘Loans from the
Public’ and were over twice what was to be taken as foreign assistance.
I shall return to this central premise of public policy in the fifties that the
public sector was expected to contribute resources to the larger project
of national development.
Thus far I have been concerned with trying to establish what the
leadership of the Nehru era had in mind as the ends and means. We have
a reasonably good picture already but this gets crystallised when we
read the speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru himself. Recall that Nehru was
the Chairman of the Planning Commission and was closely involved
with the planning process. These speeches would be of interest to us
today not only in revealing the arduous process of deliberation by which
policy was formed but point to the remarkable grasp that as an active
career politician Nehru had on matters economic.
The first of these, made in 1952, gives us two insights into the
economic calculations of the political leadership. It reveals that the idea
28.  See Planning Commission (1956).
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of industrialisation as a goal to raise incomes was adopted even before
the Mahalanobis model that had undergirded the Second Plan was written
down. Further, it conveys the full recognition among the planners of the
importance of agricultural growth to the industrialisation project. The
extract follows: “There is much talk of industrialisation. In the initial
chapters of the Plan, certain figures pertaining to the amounts allotted to
industry, agriculture, social services, transport, etc., are given. In this
respect, industry does not seem to occupy as important a place as
agriculture. If I remember correctly, a very large sum is to be spent on
irrigation. We certainly attach importance to industry, but in the present
context we attach far greater importance to agriculture and food and
matters pertaining to agriculture. If our agricultural foundation is not
strong then the industry we seek to build will not have a strong basis
either. Apart from that, the situation in the country today is such that if
our food front cracks up, everything else will crack up, too. Therefore
we dare not weaken our food front. If our agriculture becomes strongly
entrenched, as we hope it will, then it will be relatively easy for us to
progress more rapidly on the industrial front, whereas if we concentrate
only on industrial development and leave agriculture in a weak condition
we shall ultimately be weakening industry. That is why primary attention
has been given to agriculture and food and that, I think, is essential in a
country like India at the present moment.”29  This speech was made at a
relatively early stage of the economic transformation that was being
attempted. I now quote from two sets of speeches made almost at the
end of Nehru’s tenure as prime minister, indeed close to the end of his
life. The first is really a politician’s justification of the policies pursued
by his government, and reads as such, but it does contain a clear
understanding of the inter-temporal distribution of gains that was central
to the economic strategy that was being pursued. It also reflects a certain
understanding of the uniqueness of India, not in a civilisational sense
29 “Economic Democracy”, speech made in Parliament on December 15,
1952,‘Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches 1949-53’, Publications Division, Ministry
of Information and Broadcasting, GoI.
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but in the sense of the challenges it faces given its economic backwardness
and its democratic polity. The extracts follow: “Planning has of course
been done in other countries; but not through democratic processes. Other
countries which are democratic have not accepted planning. But the
combination of these two concepts is rather unique. ………………….
The first thing we realised was that it was no good copying America or
Russia or any other country. The problems of India are her own. We can
learn from America or Russia, as certainly we should. But the economic
problems of India are different. We learn from them, of course, as they
have acquired great experience. We always realised that the fundamental
factor was growth in agricultural production. Agriculture is basic to us
because however much importance we attach to industry unless we have
surplus from agriculture, we cannot progress in our economy. We cannot
live on doles from other countries. We have always to choose between
benefits accruing today, or tomorrow, or the day after. From the country’s
point of view, if we spend the money we now have for some petty
immediate benefits, there will not be any permanent benefit. One has to
find a healthy balance between the immediate benefits of today and the
long-range benefits of tomorrow. All the money we have put in heavy
industries is for tomorrow’s benefit, though it brings in some benefit
today also. It will take some years before this investment yields fruits.
……. So, our strategy of economic development is essentially
modernisation of agriculture and training of our rural masses in the use
of new tools and new methods. At the same time, it seeks to lay the
foundations of an industrial structure by building the basic or heavy
industries, above all by producing electric power. Middle and small scale
industries will inevitably come in their train.”30  A clearer articulation of
the central issues in investment planning, namely the choice of the long-
30  From “Our Policies Justified”, speech on the no-confidence motion against the
government, Lok Sabha, August 22, 1963, reprinted in ‘Jawaharlal Nehru’s
Speeches 1963-64’, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, GoI.
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run output-maximizing allocation of investment across activities would
be hard to find. The second set of speeches that I had referred to show us
a Nehru somewhat despondent regarding the extent of progress made on
the agricultural front. He even suggests that agriculture has been neglected
relative to its importance. The first extract is from a speech made to the
Chief Ministers at the annual meeting of the National Development
Council in 1963. It goes: “Emergency was declared in the wake of
Chinese invasion. … Emergency does not merely mean raising soldiers
or getting aircraft. It means production, production for defence specially.
All other types of production, more particularly on the agricultural front,
is equally necessary. … We have done many things which are creditable
to us. But the overall picture is not one of fast progress, specially in the
agricultural domain. This is rather distressing because agriculture is the
basis of all our development work. If we fail in agriculture, it does not
matter what else we achieve – how many plants we put up – our economic
development will not be complete. ….. Agriculture is more important
than industry for the simple reason that industry depends on agriculture.
Industry, which is, no doubt, very important, will not progress unless
agriculture is sound and stable and progressive. I find there is a passion
in many areas of India for industrial plants. Well, all good luck to those
who want them. Let them have it. People seem to think that an industrial
plant solves all the problems of poverty, which it does not. It has a long-
term effect on the economy, no doubt. And I have no doubt in my mind
that the problem of poverty will not be solved in India except through
industrial progress, industrial progress of the latest type. That is the truth.
However, at the present moment, whichever way you start in India, you
come back to agriculture. We dare not be slack about it, as we have
been, I’m afraid, in many places.”31  The final extract that I wish to quote
is from a speech delivered less than six months before Nehru’s death. It
31 “Agriculture – Basis of Economic Development”, speech made to the National
Development Council, New Delhi, November 8, 1963, reprinted in ‘Jawaharlal
Nehru’s Speeches 1963-64’, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, GoI.
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goes: “Though we all know that agriculture is essential and basic, it has
been rather neglected. I say neglected in the sense that people hoped
that crops will grow by themselves and not by much effort on our part.
Now, greater attention is being paid to it and I hope this will bear results.
There are all manner of things that go into agriculture. We have large
irrigation schemes, but it takes a long time for us to take advantage of
them fully. We first, spent a lot of money and energy in building them.
Between the two there has been a long gap. We should plan for their full
utilisation in advance.”32
As is often the case, political leaders are too close in time to
historical events to be able to evaluate them dispassionately. In retrospect,
Nehru was to prove himself unduly pessimistic! A growth transition in
agriculture was to come within years of this speech made to India’s chief
ministers at the annual meeting of the National Development Council in
December 1963, on which occasion Nehru had had the gall to also
pronounce that “ … agriculture is more important by itself than any
chief minister”. An acceleration in the agricultural growth rate was to
take place in the mid-sixties probably33  even in 1964-65, the year of his
death. Though he did not live to see its beneficial effects spread cross
the Indian economy by stimulating other sectors, there can be very little
doubt, as I demonstrate later, that this transition has much to do with the
policies implemented by his government. At another level it would be
difficult for a citizen in the twenty first century to encounter a member
32 “Irrigation and Power” , speech to the Conference of Ministers of Irrigation and
Power, New Delhi, January 3 , 1964, reprinted in ‘Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches
1963-64’, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, GoI.
33 See Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2007). However, while the point estimate
for the date of acceleration is 1965-66, the estimate itself comes with confidence
intervals that allow for an acceleration to have taken place anywhere between
1964 and 1966, inclusive. But precise dating is not so essential here, as I shall
argue below. In any case, the rate of growth registered in 1964-65, the year of
Nehru’s death, was at close to 12 percent the highest annual production increase
in crop agriculture in a decade and a half. See ‘Agricultural Statistics at a Glance’,
New Delhi: Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, 2003.
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of the political class as self-critical as we find Nehru in the passages that
I have quoted from above. Across the world’s democracies today,
introspection would not be considered a virtue of political practice. I
now turn to economic growth in the India of the Nehru era.
III. The recovery of India: Economic growth in the Nehru era
We may use two sets of comparators to evaluate the growth performance
of an economy. One is the record of preceding growth in that economy
itself. The other is the contemporaneous growth of other economies
similarly placed and the growth of leading economies at early stages of
their own growth. We start therefore with a comparison of growth in the
Nehru era with growth in the first half of the twentieth century, more
precisely the period 1900-47 which marks the second half of the British
Raj in India.
In Table 1 are arrayed growth rates over time of the three main
sectors of the Indian economy. The layout of the Table enables us to see
the economic performance of the Nehru era in century-wide perspective.
Table 1: The trend growth rate of GDP (1948-49 prices)
Sector 1900-1 to 1947-8 to 1950-1 to
1946-47  1999-2000  1964-5
Primary 0.4 2.5 2.6
Secondary 1.5 5.5 6.8
Tertiary 1.7 5.0 4.5
GDP 0.9 4.1 4.0
GDP per capita 0.1 1.9 1.9
Population 0.8 2.0 2.0
Notes: Data are annual average compound growth rates. Pre-1947 data
are for ‘Undivided India’ which entity includes the Indian states
and Pakistan but excludes Burma. Source: Sivasubramonian
(2005).
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In column 1 are the data for the years 1900-47. In column 2 are the data
on the same indicators for the rest of the twentieth century including the
17 years of Jawaharlal Nehru’s prime ministership. In column 3 are
presented the same indicators for the period 1950 to 1964, the year of
Nehru’s death. Read together the data convey two important points. First,
not only does growth in the Nehru years amply exceed what was attained
in the final half-century of colonial rule, but the quickening of the
economy observed in the second half of the twentieth century may  be
seen to have been already achieved34  in the Nehru era. Secondly, not
only is there an acceleration of growth across all sectors but also the
ranking of sectors by growth is reversed early with the commodity-
producing sectors now growing faster than services which had been the
fastest growing segment of the colonial economy. Following Kuznets’s
work on economic growth, high services growth in a low-income
economy would be treated as pathologicaly. In a poor economy with a
low level of consumption of even the most basic goods, a faster growth
of the commodity sectors is a desirable outcome. The broad-based
expansion of the economy during the Nehru era amounts to a
transformation of the economy is, perhaps, more likely to readily
recognised as such by economic historians. To stretch my argument a
bit, I refer35  to a debate among economic historians on the true
significance of the Industrial Revolution agreed by them to have taken
place in Europe in the middle of the eighteenth century. In this connection
Joel Mokyr, a historian of technology, has observed that growth after
the Industrial Revolution was not just higher but qualitatively different
in at least three different respects from what had gone before. First, growth
ceased to be a “niche phenomenon”. Before 1750, it had been limited to
relatively small areas or specific sectors. Second, while pre-1750 growth
34. Of course, finer partitions of the data points over 1950-2000 would yield a higher
rate of growth from the late seventies. However, it is the case that the acceleration
during the Nehru years outweighs by far the ones that followed, for which see
Parameswaran (2007).
35. I thank M. Suresh Babu for having drawn my attention to this literature.
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had seen “institutional change in the widest sense”, technological change
though not absent was far too slow and localised compared to the role it
was to play afterwards. Third, ‘pre-modern’ growth was vulnerable to
setbacks and shocks both man-made and natural that made doubtful its
sustainability. While it may not be entirely appropriate to transfer this
description to the transformation of India during the Nehru era, as a
certain amount of modern industry was in place by 1947, the parallels
are there to see. Though not all three of Mokyr’s observations are evident
from the data I have presented in Table 1, it would be agreed upon that
the Nehru years witnessed widespread growth across the economy, a
technological advance was fostered, and we now see that the growth in
income has not only been sustained for over fifty years but the growth
rate itself has actually been ‘hastening slowly’36 . However, two of
Mokyr’s comments on the significance of the Industrial Revolution appear
to have been tailor-made for the period that we are studying here. First,
in response to the observation that the growth achieved in the early stage
of the Revolution was not that much, he has responded that the change
must not be seen as one of mere degree: “There is a qualitative difference
between an economy in which GDP per capita grows at 1.5 percent and
one in which it grows at 0.2 percent.”37  While the parallel here between
the data for the period Mokyr speaks of and India for our period is, as is
evident from Table 1, close indeed, it is Mokyr’s more general comment
on the significance of the Industrial Revolution that is, in my view, of
greater import. His evaluation is that: “It may have been slow, it may
have been not all that industrial and even less revolutionary, it may not
even have been wholly British, but it was the taproot of modern economic
growth.”38   To seek parallels between the growth following the Industrial
36. The accelerations in the growth of GDP during the second half of the twentieth
century have been statistically established by Balakrishnan and Parameswaran
(2007).
37. Mokyr (2005), p. 286.
38. ibid., p. 286.
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Revolution in Britain and the growth of India during the Nehru era is a
promising line of inquiry for a historian of the Indian economy. On the
other hand, I shall now put to use Mokyr’s characterisation of the
Industrial Revolution not to draw a parallel but to highlight a difference
between the two periods under comparison here. While growth in the
Nehru era was distinctly Indian, in that it was not dependent on either
foreign trade or foreign aid, it certainly was “not all that industrial”.
Indeed the greatest expansion of the economy in the Nehru years is not
in industry at all. While the categories for which growth is recorded in
Table 1 are somewhat broad, the data reveal that growth acceleration in
the Primary sector, largely comprising agriculture, had exceeded that of
the Secondary sector, more or less synonymous with industry. This has
generally gone unrecognised, and I shall return to consider at length
both the approach to agriculture and the record of its performance in
these years. But for now it is worth repeating Sivasubramonian’s apposite
assessment of the economic achievement of this period. He speaks of
the economic recovery of the Nehru era as having been “swift, smooth
and remarkable.”39  Before moving on I might raise a point crucial to
the comparison of growth over time. As the comparison has to be made
at constant prices to be of any value, the choice of the base year for
prices is crucial. I have used Sivasubramonian’s estimates of GDP as
they provide data at constant prices for the entire twentieth century. There
are of course alternative estimates for the period 1900-47 and these give
way to a very different insight into the period. For instance, Angus
Maddison’s estimates40  of GDP growth in 1938-9 prices for this period
show the average annual growth rate of per capita output during this
period almost stagnant at 0.04 percent per annum. This estimate would
39. Sivasubramonian (2005), p. 563. This is noticeably at odds with the customary
assessment of the economic record of the Nehru era by economists. Historians,
it appears, bring a greater objectivity to the study of the economy than economists
as they tend to privilege economic theory less.
40. Reported by Sivasubramonian (2005), Table 6.3.
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suggest a far more significant turnaround following the end  of the colonial
era. I now turn to the second of the two standard comparators of the
growth performance of an economy, the performance of other economies.
Two sets of economies have been chosen here for comparison with India
during the Nehru era. The first is a set of Asian economies. These were
more or less on par with India in terms of per capita income in 1950.
The second is a set of the world’s best-performing economies of all time.
In Table 2 are presented growth rates attained by these two. Of the two
sets of economies for which data are presented a comparison of India’s
performance with that of the Asian economies is of greater interest for
two reasons. First, the data are for the same period and secondly, as
stated, in terms of per-capita income Korea and China had economies
that were more or less on par with India in 1950. A noteworthy finding
emerges. From the work of De Long41  we know that though India has
grown faster than most of Africa during the last five decades it has
performed worse than East Asia. If Korea is taken as synonymous with
East Asia this feature holds also for the period 1950-64. Korea’s growth
rate is 50 percent higher than India’s for this period. However, we find
that India’s growth rate is 25 percent higher than that of China. This is





United States - 3.6
United Kingdom - 1.9
Japan - 2.8
Notes: Data are annual average growth rates. Source: Maddison (1995).
41.  DeLong (2004).
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little known but is not entirely surprising. Actually, China was to pull
ahead of India only a decade and a half beyond the Nehru era, in the late
seventies and following the reforms unleashed by Deng Xiao Ping.
Possessed of this information we are led to speculate that admiration for
Mao in India during his lifetime must have been based on grounds other
than mere economic achievements. This is clear, for the revelations of
the disastrous consequences of the Great Leap Forward – including an
estimated thirty million deaths allegedly due to famine in the late fifties
– were received sanguinely here in India. While this may well be expected
of the ideologically committed, one thing is clear from our comparison.
In a comparison with China it now appears that Nehru had not left the
Indian at any great disadvantage. The subsequent tearing away of China,
and the falling behind of India in the growth-league tables, owes itself to
causes other than his leadership.
No less revealing is a comparison of the growth in India during
1950-64 with long term growth in the leading OECD economies. We
find from Table 2 that the former had exceeded the latter, often
substantially. It is now possible to place in perspective Raj Krishna’s
lament42  that independent India’s record of growth till the late seventies
placed it lower than one hundred economies world-wide. Krishna had
used per capita GDP as his measure. This succeeds in masking the degree
of progress made in the Nehru era. An altogether unexpected consequence
of the transformation of the economy had been a very significant rise43
in the rate of growth of population. Now the measured rate of growth of
per capita GDP is lowered. Two observations are in order here. From
Table 1 we can see that were the rate of growth of population to remain
at the colonial rate the rate of growth of per capita income during 1950-
64 would have exceeded 3 percent. This is more than twice44  the rate of
42.  See Krishna (1982).
43.  See Table 1.
44.  See Maddison (1995).
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growth of per capita income of US and UK during 1820-1992, and
exceeds that attained by Japan during the same period. Before I move on
to my second observation I might remark that, actually, the counterfactual
considered is quite absurd as the growth of population is very likely
endogenous with respect to the growth of income. This leads me to the
observation itself. The rise in the rate of growth of population per se
serves as an indicator far more vivid of the extent and nature of the
economic transformation than any estimated rise in the rate of growth.
Life expectancy at birth rose from 32 years in the 1940s to 37 years in
the 1950s and to 43 years in the 60s.45  Demographers46  have put the
rise in the rate of growth of population in the period that we are studying
down to the increase in the fertility rate, itself due to the decline in the
incidence of malaria and widowhood, presumably due to improving
public health outreach.
A methodological point needs to be made here that is more than a
mere justification for the method that I have pursued. Note that in Table
2 I have compared growth in India during the Nehru years with very
long term growth of the advanced OECD economies. Far from loading
the comparison in favour of the former, as it may appear, this actually
tilts the balance in the direction of the latter. For we know that long-term
growth of the industrialised economies has accelerated47  over the last
couple of centuries. Therefore the longer the time period we consider
the greater the likelihood of observing a higher growth rate for these
economies when compared with a shorter series commencing from a
time when their per capita income was the same as that of India’s in, say,
1950. This observation has, in addition, the virtue of placing in perspective
the achievement of the Nehru era. In the presence of increasing returns
45. Bhat (2001).
46. ibid.
47. See Romer (1986).
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to scale the observed growth cannot be dismissed48  merely as the
arithmetic consequence of measuring a given increase against a ‘low
base’. That would at best be a statistical commentary. It misses that from
an economic standpoint, initiating growth in the presence of increasing
returns to scale, a low base is actually a serious impediment to growth,
for the lower the scale of production the lower, proportionately, is the
surplus available for investment. Thus high growth on a low base is non-
trivial; and the recognition as a substantial achievement its initiation in
the nineteen fifties – after half a century of stagnation - the compelling
conclusion. Interestingly, at the time, Nehru himself had demonstrated a
clear idea of the magnitudes involved in the task of raising the rate of
growth: “We have aimed at 5 percent in this Plan, and five percent is
going to be a hard job. We shall have to work very hard, because we
have started at such low levels, with such low surpluses. India is almost
at the lowest rung of the income ladder. Even China, I believe, is a little
higher. So was Russia at the time of the Revolution.”49  The challenge
had been sharply appraised.
IV.  Movement along a broad front: What quickened India?
As is evident from the discussion in the previous section there can be no
debate over the fact of the dramatic quickening of the Indian economy
since the initiation of planned economic development in the second half
of the twentieth century. To quote a prominent economist of the time
48  An instance of this tendency may also be found in the reported comments on
economic growth in India by Alan Greenspan. Having first castigated Nehru’s
“Fabian socialism”, Greenspan acknowledges the higher growth in recent years,
but plays down the acceleration as having been from “off a low base”. See ‘Give
up socialism: Greenspan’, Times of India, New Delhi, 2007. Apart from its
oracular nature the observation displays an empirical oversight in that India had
already grown at over 5 percent per annum in the 1980s which was the highest
rate of growth outside of East Asia by then.
49 From “The Second Five-Year Plan”, speech initiating the debate on the Second
Five-Year Plan in the Lok Sabha on 23 March 23, 1956, reprinted in ‘ Jawaharlal
Nehru’s Speeches 1953-57’, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, GoI.
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writing soon after the death of Nehru “… the percentage increase in
national income in the last thirteen years has been higher than the
percentage increase realised in India over the entire preceding half
century.”50  However, its remains to be established what brought about
this transformation. Accounting for this transformation would serve a
constituency larger than those with a particular interest in the recent
history of India. It would constitute one answer to the larger question
already flagged and of abiding interest to economists the world over,
‘How do economies grow?”51
To get a handle on the task that confronts us we may start by
eliminating the factors that clearly cannot be credited with the turnaround.
Going by the conventional wisdom of today trade would be a prime
candidate to consider as potentially crucial. For a sample of the view
that openness is central to faster growth consider this: “Low or declining
barriers to trade constitute a necessary condition for sustained rapid
growth.”52  This clearly is a non-starter in the context, for the fifteen
years from 1950 had witnessed a progressive closing of the trade regime.
Of course, export promotion is not necessarily at odds with a regime of
imports controls, especially in the 1950s when international surveillance
was not of the order that we find today. So it would not be entirely
absurd to imagine export-led growth even in a relatively protectionist
regime. But this is clearly not a reasonable description of the Nehru era
when the economy had faced severe balance-of-payments stress, one
coming soon after the death of Nehru, and in some ways reflective of
the policies pursued under his leadership. In fact, as stated, Mahalanobis
had been inspired by a vision of an India permanently freed from the
balance of payments constraint but this was certainly not achieved even
ten years after the launching of the Second Five-Year Plan. This, however,
50. Raj (1965).
51. See Scott (1997).
52. Panagariya (1997), p.7.
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is the right moment to remind ourselves that a balance of payments
surplus is not a recipe for faster growth. It is instructive in this context to
note that India had ended its colonial period with positive sterling
balances. Nevertheless, the period 1900-47 was one of the most stagnant
phases in India’s recorded history. To take a more contemporary example,
in the second half of the twentieth century, Africa has remained one of
the more open economic areas of the world.53  However, this has not
prevented it from remaining the most depressed.
Let us now consider another possibility among factors responsible
for faster growth in India. This is the end of colonialism. It is interesting
that while discussing the history of globalisation some ignore the fact
that in the nineteenth century much of the non-European world was
colonised. As a response, Milanovic (2003) has argued that to judge the
history of globalisation purely by growth rates without reference to the
colonialism54  that had shackled these economies is really to miss a
significant aspect of the reality and detracts from such growth that may
have been achieved, even if in some cases quite substantial. My reference
to the reality that India was a colony for about two centuries prior to
1947 is significant in another way though. This is that the Indian economy
had been subjugated to Britain’s imperial interests, stifling India’s
potential. Though some economists today tend to overlook this55  it was
recognised by Indian entrepreneurs of the time. In particular, the visionary
nationalist engineer M. Visveswaraya (1936) has written extensively of
the obstructions by the colonial Government of India that Indian
industrialists had faced in their plans to invest in new projects and points
to this as reason for the failure to industrialise56  the Indian sub-continent.
A simple test of this would be whether the tide turned after the end of
53 Castells (2000).
54 See also Nehru (1946).
55 See Lal (1999).
56 See  also Bagchi (1972) for a contemporary economist’s perspective on the
period.
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colonialism and India’s entrepreneurs, set free from the colonial yoke,
led a turnaround of the economy. This is a proposition difficult to test, as
‘everything else’ did not ‘remain the same’ violating ceteris paribus the
very staple of economists. Principally, the post-colonial state had adopted
a role which would have profound implications for private sector
behaviour. On the one hand it intervened in the economy by raising
public investment which is likely to have provided demand, and therefore
greater profits than otherwise, for the private sector’s product. On the
other hand, it intervened heavily in some sectors. Indeed, in the minds
of some, it stifled the private sector as much as it had been stifled by the
colonial Government of India. In any case, the change in the overall
policy regime makes it difficult to deny that Indian entrepreneurship
was stifled under the Raj even if the private sector is seen not to have led
the revival after 1947. But more importantly, we have seen that the revival
of the Indian economy was broad based57  while the sector that had
allegedly been suppressed most, in order to further British industrial
interests, during the colonial era was the manufacturing sector. So the
end of the colonial subjugation of India cannot per se be credited with
the subsequent rise of India, even though the end of colonialism was
sine qua non for an enabling political environment for India’s
development. The reason for this must be sought in some more active
agency. How then was the dramatic turnaround of India achieved? There
can be no doubt that it was state directed58 . However, it yet remains to
provide an account of the mechanism.
The quickening of the economy follows the overcoming of a ‘co-
ordination failure’ that had left India in a low-level equilibrium trap59
57. See Table 1.
58. Indeed, this must be the obvious conclusion of those who claim that an
excessively interventionist state in India under Nehru had left the private sector
ham-strung.
59. The rest of this section draws substantially on the imaginative portrayal of this
view of economic underdevelopment by Ray (1998).
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for close to half a century. To see how low levels of income can result
from co-ordination failure we need to first apprehend the idea of
complementarities among economic activities. This is best understood
in the context of a firm considering making an investment. A central
element in this decision problem is the firm’s forecast of its future
productivity. Now this productivity depends upon the future path of
average capital accumulation by all firms in the economy. If our firm
believes that this path will swiftly rise it would predict a correspondingly
high rate of growth of its own productivity, because of the ‘externality’
involved. Where firms hold identical expectations each firm will be more
willing to invest, raising the rate of growth of its capital and thus income
in the economy. We see here that the decision to accumulate capital by
one firm provides an incentive for others to undertake the same action.
This is the externality referred to. Here it takes the specific form of a
complementarity in that capital accumulation by one firm encourages
capital accumulation by others.
It was Rosenstein-Rodan, reflecting upon the question of the
reconstruction of a war-torn Europe, who had identified the role of
complementarities in precipitating a low level equilibrium trap. He had
proposed that a low level of income is the outcome of an economy-wide
co-ordination failure, in which some investments do not occur simply
because other complementary investments are not made and the latter
are not forthcoming only because the former are missing. It is possible
to comprehend this from the decision problem of the firm that we had
considered. At a very general plane one firm’s investment is the source
of another firm’s profits making this other firm viable, thus providing it
the incentive to invest.
Co-ordination failure results as follows. Where no entrepreneur is
large enough to invest in more than one line of activity each entrepreneur
would invest only if he were to believe that others would invest as well.
Now we have two possible equilibria: one in which the region is devoid
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of any investment at all and another in which there is investment by all
(as expectations are uniform across firms). This has been referred to as a
‘co-ordinated equilibrium’ in that each firm’s decision is based on its
expectation of the behaviour of others resulting in an outcome co-
ordinated in this sense. In this account a low-level equilibrium is a market
failure. A better outcome – with income high - is possible, but is not
necessarily attained in an economy of free agents maximising profits.
Notice that whether or not such an outcome arises depends upon each
agent’s expectations of the actions of others. To the extent that the
formation of expectations is driven by past history, a stagnant society
could remain so whereas an active one would remain active, even though
there may be nothing intrinsically different between the two regions.
The idea of a co-ordination failure – whereby an economy is
trapped in a ‘bad’ equilibrium when a more desirable one exists – is
particularly compelling in a diverse economy with industries developed
to a different degree, if only for the reason that now co-ordination across
these many diverse industries would be required. Such diversity is likely
to be appropriately descriptive of the Indian economy at independence.
If ‘coordination failure’ describes well the stagnant state of the Indian
economy at that point in time, it is also easy to imagine the complexity
of the task of achieving a co-ordinated expansion to a higher level of
income in a large and diversified economy.
The early literature on development economics had proposed two
solutions to the co-ordination problem. To understand them we need to
take on board the concept of linkages. This concept springs from the
view that the economy is an interlinked entity. Hirschman (1958) had
conceived of backward and forward linkages. Forward linkages ease the
supply conditions of a sector. Thus the steel industry facilitates the
development of the railways by making available a crucial input at a
lower price. On the other hand, a backward linkage raises the demand
for the product of a sector, as when the development of the steel industry
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historically raised the demand for coal. Forward linkages push the
economy while backward linkages pull it so to speak. This feature, that
an economy is interlinked, provides the means and an opportunity to
shift the economy out of a co-ordination failure that leaves it stranded at
a low level of income. Rosenstein-Rodan had proposed a Big Push, being
a programme of co-ordinated investment in several sectors meant to shock
an economy out of its slumber so to speak. Such a policy has two
requirements. The first is economic in that a very large investment outlay
is needed to make a difference. The second requirement is informational.
The ‘co-ordinator’ – reasonably assumed to be the state alone – must
have an idea of the proportions in which consumers spend their income
on the different commodities, or we could end up having too much coal
and too little soap, for instance. However, the existence of linkages
between the sectors of an economy enable the co-ordinator to overcome
both these. This takes us to the solution proposed by Hirschman.
Hirschman had pointed out that Rosenstein-Rodan’s proposal of
investing in the major sectors simultaneously was akin to promoting
balanced growth in the economy. Instead we could envisage unbalanced
growth, a situation where the initial investment is targeted on some
specific sector(s). Indeed, the idea is to deliberately foster unbalanced
growth by investing in certain leading sectors. With this, linkages both
forward and backward are activated and the production response gets
the whole economy moving. Exactly as does the Big Push, this strategy
too shifts the economy onto the desirable equilibrium. However, it differs
in that it makes use of the market, exploiting potential linkages, with the
government presumably investing only in the leading sector. Note that
this strategy is less vulnerable to the two requirements of the Big Push,
for here both the scale of the public investment entailed and the
informational requirement are likely to be less. But where the
government’s investible resources are limited and not all sectors are
equally endowed with linkages the question of which sector to choose is
not a trivial one. It is obvious that the sector(s) chosen must possess both
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numerous and strong links. However, it is a less obvious criterion that
emerges as of interest, that of the intrinsic profitability of a sector. In the
context, this is a treacherous concept as we had introduced the idea of a
complementarity by arguing that the profitability of an investment
depends upon investments elsewhere in the economy! But let us overlook
the circularity that this implies and persist with the idea of intrinsic
profitability best captured by the American expression ‘bang for the
buck’. Once we have arrayed activities according to their intrinsic
profitability, the investment priority of government would be the exact
reverse of that of the private sector. That is, in the context, the
government’s priority would be to first invest in the least profitable sector
because this is unlikely to be taken up by the private sector. Exactly as a
chain is only as strong as its weakest link, “… the government maximises
the chances of overcoming coordination failure by investing in the least
profitable activity, provided of course that such activities have linkages
as well.”60  Now choosing the least profitable sector while leaving the
rest to the market is actually of strategic intent.
This extended foray into the debates in early development
economics was meant to provide a window onto what was attempted in
India in the Nehru years. We of course know that, in a bid to quicken the
economy, a programme of massive public investment was initiated with
the onset of planning in 1951. However, it is of interest yet to understand
how precisely this may have worked to bring about the dramatic rise in
the rate of growth. Debraj Ray61  has imaginatively suggested that the
Mahalanobis Model was essentially a scheme for promoting unbalanced
growth, with heavy industry as the leading sector. It is certainly true that
heavy industry has substantial linkages with the rest of the economy –
forward into agriculture and backward into consumer goods and services.
Ray’s is an interesting insight and appears to be borne out by the data on
60. Ray (1998), p. 141.
61. Ray (1998), pp. 142-3.
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the sectoral allocation of investment in the Second Five-Year Plan
presented in Table 3. We find that, in line with popular perception,
‘Industry’ does get the largest share of the outlay. However, this is not
overwhelmingly so. First, there are sectors that come close to having
been allocated a similar share. Secondly, and in any case, industry’s
share does not exceed twenty five percent. Therefore, while this may
count for its being singled out as the ‘leading’ sector, the suggestion of
an `unbalanced growth’ strategy having been pursued would appear
inappropriate as a characterisation. Of course, in relative terms industry
was allocated much more than agriculture than conveyed by the figure
for  industry per se for it had a much smaller share of GDP than agriculture
in 1956. But what strikes one most after a gap of half a century is how
well-balanced the allocation of investment appears to be given India’s
needs at that stage. Also, the large allocation to industry must be seen in
perspective. I repeat a point made by me earlier and one that I shall
return to.  This is that the planners had envisioned industrialisation
contributing directly to raising agricultural productivity and thus
agricultural growth. This is a case of recognising (forward) linkages,
even a little before the publication of Hirschman’s article on unbalanced
growth as a strategy. Nevertheless, though the Mahalanobis model, that
Table 3: The allocation of public investment in the Second




Transport and Communication 850 25.0
Agriculture and Irrigation 750 22.1
Construction 250 7.4
Stocks 100 2.9
Source: ‘Recommendation for the Second Five-year Plan’, Planning
Commission, 1956.
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had undergirded the drive to industrialisation launched by the Indian
state, did have as its central element the heavy goods sector - with
similarity to a strategy of unbalanced growth – I find it more convincing
to see the quickening of the Indian economy as due to a Big Push driven
by expanding public investment62 . Not only was there a wide spreading
of this investment across the economy, as depicted in Table 3, but the
economy had already quickened63  before the launching of the Second
Five-Year Plan, and all the sectors were to accelerate again, though at
differing points, over the next three decades. However, the most important
reason for rejecting an unbalanced-growth type explanation for the
acceleration of growth in India during the Nehru era is that the
acceleration was very likely led by agriculture. This may be surmised by
taking the data in Table 1 along with the additional information that
agriculture constituted by far the largest share of the economy in the
1950s. Recall that a sector’s contribution to overall growth is its share-
weighted growth rate. The full contribution to Indian economic
development of the state-directed heavy-industry-drive was to come much
later, and some suggest continues to this day.64  Be that as it may, the
industrial sector did expand substantially65  in the Nehru era. Its
accelerated growth during this period along with that of the agricultural
and services sectors indicates the ‘movement along a broad front’ that is
the hallmark of the Big Push strategy.
The argument that the expansion of the Indian economy in the
post-colonial era may be seen as due to a state-directed drive such as a
Big Push is properly verified by reference to the data on public investment.
Data on saving and investment by the public and private sectors are
provided in Table 4.
62. For a suggestion along these lines see Rao (2004).
63. See Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2007).
64. See Reddy (2006).
65. See Table 1.
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All of it points to the plausibility of the explanation that I have
provided.  Several points may be noted. First and foremost there is a
very substantial expansion of public investment as a share of GDP. Such
an expansion, exceeding two and a half times the original figure by the
end of the Nehru era, has not been matched in India for the next quarter
century66 . Though not apparent from the highly aggregative data
presented here it is not only the magnitude of the expansion of public
investment that is significant, but also its direction. As in a Big Push,
investment was to have flowed in all directions67  simultaneously.
Contrast this with the limited public spending outside of administration
and the railways by the colonial government. Interestingly, there is an
almost identical expansion of the private corporate sector during this
period. This too is unmatched for the next twenty five years68 . Some
comments would be appropriate. The first concerns causality. Even
though the expansion is contemporaneous, going by economic theory
we would imagine the public sector contributing to the expansion of
private investment by having expanded the market for its goods and at
the same time supplying the capital goods necessary at a lower price.
Secondly, the degree of expansion of the private sector in the Nehru era
Table 4 : Saving and Investment (% of GDP)
Year Private corporate sector Public sector
S I (S-I) S I (S-I)
1950-55 1.0 1.4 -0.4 1.7 3.1 -1.4
1960-65 1.7 3.6 -1.9 3.0 7.5 - 4.4
1989-90 2.1 3.9 -1.8 1.7 10.7 -9.0
Source: National Accounts Statistics, CSO.
66. See Table 4.
67. See Table 3.
68. See Table 4.
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is perhaps little known today and seldom recognised as a feature of the
period. However, this record makes it a little difficult to sustain the
argument that the policy regime was relentlessly hostile to it. Added to
this is the fact that the expansion of the private sector was also very
likely financed by the other sectors within the economy. Note that the
saving-investment gap for the private corporate sector widened very
substantially during this period. This implies that corporate investment
was financed by the household sector, the external sector and by the
public sector69  itself. Therefore, it is not as if, in the era of high planning,
the private sector had had to pull itself up by its bootstraps. Of course,
this could have neutralized none of the heavy-handedness of a
bureaucratic approach that may have stifled many firms and retarded
private-sector development. However, judging by the expansion in
investment, it would not be inappropriate to surmise that the private
corporate sector as a whole appears not to have done too badly70  in the
Nehru era.
The role of the government in quickening the economy in the
second half of the twentieth century is unmistakable. It was of course in
keeping with the plan of the Indian state. However, the government’s
calculations, had in the process, gone awry on one count. This pertains
to the role of external assistance in financing plan outlay in the public
sector. As I have already pointed out, the proposed budget for the Second
Five-Year Plan had anticipated for foreign assistance a share of only 5
percent in total public expenditure. The outcome was to turn out far
different. The shares of different sources in the financing of public sector
outlay during the Nehru era (and slightly beyond, as we have included
the entire Third Plan period) are to be found in Table 5. Note that the
69. “… investment in industry in the private sector (was) largely assisted by financing
institutions in the public sector, and by fiscal concessions and tax incentives
provided by Government”, Rao (1971), p. 72.
70. For a qualitative assessment of the gains to the private sector during the Nehru
era see Zachariah (2004).
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figure recorded for the Second Plan had exceeded by far the figure of 5
percent. More significantly, the share of foreign assistance had risen
steadily after the commencement of planning.
The role of foreign assistance in financing the public expenditure
which in turn had stepped-up the rate of growth in India cannot be
overlooked. Indeed, by the end of the Third Plan, at close to 30 percent
it was a significant input. This is mostly glossed over. However, three
observations may be made related to foreign inflow to public expenditure
in India. First, except for the Soviet Union it is difficult to think of many
other countries that have transformed their economies so rapidly without
external financing. The United States had received British capital and
Britain in its time had had its trade surplus with India, arguably some of
it disguised plunder. China had71  had aid from the USSR and South
Korea from the United States. So foreign assistance per se does not take
away from India’s achievement in transforming her economy quite rapidly
and against significant odds. Secondly, by comparison with other
developing countries attempting a similar transformation at that time,
the amounts received by India were not large in relation to its size. For
Table 5:  Financing of the Public sector Plan
First Second Third Seventh
Plan  Plan  Plan Plan
Own resources 38.4 26.3 33.8 27.4
Domestic capital receipts 35.0 30.8 24.8 48.9
Net foreign inflow 9.6 22.5 28.2 8.7
Deficit financing 17.0 20.4 13.2 15.1
   Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bagchi and Nayak (1994).
71. Indeed also in the unique form of “complete plant installations for machine-
building industries” as trade credit. See Raj (1967), p. 24.
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instance, at US$ 1.8 – being the average for the years 1962 and 1963 –
the aid per capita received by India was a fifth of that received by south
Korea and less that thirty times that received by Israel. In 1964-65, total
aid - loans and grants - stood at 3.5 percent of national income72 . Finally,
it is significant that, at least during the Nehru era, aid did not compromise
India’s economic policy. As Bhagwati and Desai (1970) have observed:
“By and large the aid has gone towards ‘Industrial Development’. This
is in keeping with, and sharply underlines, the general Indian strategy of
development as also the economic philosophies of the time which under-
emphasised the productive significance of expenditure on education and
other social services as also the role of agriculture.”73  Indeed, India’s
position appears to have been stronger than it is today when in somewhat
frantically seeking foreign direct-investment by show-casing its economic
arrangements it appears to have lost a sense of its priorities, the haste to
usher in full capital-account convertibility being the most noticeable case
in point. Of course, more than any particular strength of India’s the ready
availability of external funding for her economic plan in the 1950s had
to do with the international politics of the time. The Nehru era had
coincided with much of the Cold War and as a non-aligned country India
had been sought after by the protagonists on both sides. While Soviet
aid had come early and without strings, aid from the west and the
multilateral loans under the aegis of this grouping predominated over
loans from the Eastern Block though they did come at a higher rate of
interest 74 . There is altogether little reason to believe that Indian economic
policy had been influenced by excessive dependence on borrowing from
any particular source. On the contrary, Kalecki75  surely had had India
in mind when he compared the non-aligned countries to calves that sucked
milk from two cows!
72. See Bhagwati and Desai (1970), p. 181and Table 10.3.
73. Bhagwati and Desai (1970), p. 187.
74. Bhagwati and Desai (1970), Tables 10.1, 10.2 and 10.5.
75. Kalecki (1993).
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IV.  Caricature of a vision: Through a glass, darkly
In a final section I address some lingering misperceptions regarding the
Nehru-Mahalanobis Strategy and the outcome of the policies that had
been adopted as a consequence. Though these are often propagated by
simplistic or, worse still, sentimental readings I consider it important to
do so as the allegation that we continue to pay for a misguided road map
is a serious one.
IV.1  ‘The neglect of agriculture’
There are two ways in which a sector can be neglected. First it could be
ignored in the policy discourse itself, with insufficient attention devoted
to its problems. Negligence could also take the form of insufficient
resources being devoted to the desired expansion of a sector. I have
already suggested in the course of the discussion so far that agriculture
had received direct attention and considerable resources during the Nehru
era. To widen the window I first present the view on the matter of two
economists of the time, and then return to provide my own perspective.
V.K.R.V. Rao, an early doyen of Indian economists, had had a ringside
view of the Indian economy for over five decades starting about 1940.
He has had the following to say: “It has been alleged that the priorities
assigned … in India’s planned development have been based on a
mistaken imitation of Soviet planning and that higher priority should
have been given to agriculture and consumer industries instead of to
capital goods industries. … The emphasis placed on capital goods
industries was the result of an understandable desire to furnish the country
with domestic supplies of the crucial inputs of economic growth so that
the rate of growth could be much faster than if the country had to rely
essentially on foreign aid for its requirements of capital and intermediate
goods. Apart from this it is not correct to suggest that planning under
Nehru did not give sufficient priority to agriculture. In fact, of the total
investment undertaken during the first three Five-Year Plans ……
agriculture, including irrigation, accounted for Rs. 3, 446 crores, or 22.7
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percent, while economic infra-structure, like transport
andcommunications, and power, accounted for Rs. 5, 737 crores or 37.7
percent and social services for Rs. 2, 760 crores or 18.1 per cent. Industry
accounted for only Rs. 2, 651 crores or 17.2 per cent of investment in
the public sector during the fifteen years covered by the three Plans.”76
Raj Krishna was an economist in a very different mould from
V.K.R.V. Rao. Chicago-trained and, in the political climate of the time,
with a reputation for being somewhat of a right winger, he was perhaps
a more acute an observer of the Indian economy than most of his peers.
Overall, Raj Krishna suggests that there may have been mistakes only in
the proportions in which investment had flowed into different channels
rather than “  … in the choice of the plural strategy which had always
characterized Indian planning.” On the specific issue that we are
considering he has stated: “ … Nehru, as indeed all planners, attached
prime importance to agriculture. Nearly a fifth of the public sector Plan
outlay has been consistently allocated to agricultural development. In
addition, heavy investments were made in industries producing
agricultural inputs and processing agricultural outputs. There was a
massive increase in the flow of credit to the agricultural sector from Rs.
70 crores in 1950-51 to Rs. 2, 000 crores in 1975-6. Almost all agricultural
inputs are subsidized; agricultural income is lightly taxed, and during
the last thirteen years minimum prices, covering the full cost of production
have been guaranteed for all major crops. This set of policies can hardly
be described as embodying the neglect of agriculture. But the fact still
remains that the allocations for agriculture (particularly irrigation,
extension and fertilizer production) and for rural infrastructure and social
services could and should have been higher.”77  The facts of the case, at
least with respect to the allocation of resources, as presented by Rao and
Krishna must persuade all but the willful disbeliever. Of course, it would
76. Rao (1971), p. 72.
77. Krishna (1982), p. 60.
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be the case that in per capita terms the direct allocation to agriculture
was certainly lower than that to industry as the rural population dwarfed
every other cohort in the economy. But this would be a myopic approach
to things.  To state somewhat differently a point already made, planned
industrialisation was hardly a rival to agricultural expansion as
Mahalanobis had seen it. On the contrary, faster agricultural growth it
was diagnosed needed more industrial inputs, whether fertiliser for
nutrient replenishment, iron and steel for implements or cement for
irrigation conduits. Moreover, agricultural production was relatively free
from controls in the Nehru era while private industry was subject to
stringent policy controls, notably licensing.
There is of course an entirely different approach to assessing the
belief that agriculture was neglected. This is to account for intent by
outcome rather than pronouncement. Now only the performance matters.
We have already looked at the data on agricultural growth in the Nehru
era though nested within the larger category of ‘Primary Sector’. The
data presented  in Table 1 shows unambiguousy that the agricultural
sector grew very impressively under Nehru, recording the highest growth
among all sectors and making a dramatic recovery from the colonial era.
This can hardly be seen to result from negligence78 . Indeed, the scale of
this achievement and the role of political agency in the form of leadership
is fully comprehended only when we study in some detail the state of
Indian agriculture in 1947.
Though it is the de-industrialisation of India under colonial rule
that has received most attention it is decimation of the countryside that
is perhaps the leitmotif of the British Raj. For a century and a half, ending
with the Bengal Famine of 1943, there had been some devastating famines
in India with one particular famine in Bengal under the East India
Company in the eighteenth century wiping out an estimated one third of
the population. These famines were directly related to the policies of
78 For a rejection as “simplistic” of the claim of the neglect of agriculture under
planning see Srinivasan (1996).
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extortionate taxation and forced commercialisation of agriculture pursued
by the Company. As historians have provided outstanding accounts and
analyses of these events I go directly to summarise the findings of George
Blyn on the trend in output in the first half of the twentieth century. Blyn
had divided the period 1891-1947 into ten overlapping ten-year slices
which he termed ‘reference decades’. He then estimated the average
annual rate of growth and the change in the rate of growth across these
reference decades for foodgrains and non-foodgrains separately. To help
focus a little better on his findings I have collected in Table 6 the estimates
for foodgrains. This data presents us with an unedifying picture of  Indian
agriculture under the Raj. First, the rate of growth of foodgrains as a
whole is far lower than the rate of growth of population implying,
declining availability. The output of rice, the grain consumed by the
largest number in India then (and now), actually declines. His findings
are summarized thus by Blyn: “In the most general measure of the change
in rates over time, the trend in reference decade rates, all eight foodgrains
Table 6:  Agricultural growth in British India
Crop Average annual growth Change in the reference-











Source: Blyn (1966), p. 96.
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showed retardation.”79  The record of non-foodgrains is better with a far
greater average growth rate in the aggregate. However, this reflects
precisely the nature of the colonial project which was the exploitation of
the natural resources and commandeering the market of the colony for
the benefit of metropolitan industry. Indeed, the glacial progress of
foodgrains production is directly related to this strategy, implemented
partly through price incentives and partly by brute80  force. Food supply
for the native population faced collateral damage.
The performance of the economy in the Nehru era must be
evaluated in light of the agricultural legacy of colonialism. To have
brought about two accelerations81  in the rate of growth of agriculture
within two decades of the end of colonial rule is nothing short of
79. Blyn (1966), p. 96.
80. “Not a chest of indigo reached England without being stained with human
blood.”, British colonial civil servant quoted by Winchester and Winchester
(2004), p. 56.
81. The information presented in Table 1 reflects only the first acceleration as we
have there treated the entire period after 1950 as one. For a demonstration of the
acceleration in agriculture towards the end of the first half of the sixties see
Balakrishnan and  Parameswaran (2007). Even if the acceleration per se is
established to have occurred immediately after the death of Nehru, the Green
Revolution ought not to be seen as episodic but the result of some years of
preparation of the seed bed, so to speak, in terms of the spread of irrigation, the
diffusion of best practices via an extension, and preparatory measures such as
field trials under the auspices of in the public agricultural research system ICAR
some of these commencing in the First Fiye-Year Plan. The comment by AM
(1964): “Despite all the gains of the last seventeen years, in many respects we
have to make up for the lost time of these very years, during which all of us have
grown a little less romantic and during which our per capita availability of food
has not gone up by a single grain.” is appropriately cautionary but wrong in its
claim regarding the progress in agriculture. The per capita net availability of
grain had grown slowly but steadily over the Nehru era despite the significant
rise in the population growth rate. Of course, that the performance could have
been better is unexceptionable, but two caveats are in order here. First, subsequent
growth in availability of foodgrains in India has barely matched the record of
this period. See ‘Economic Survey 2006-2007, Table 1.17. Secondly, the Nehru
era is the only phase in the history of post-Independence India when the relative
price of food crops actually declined, for which see Appendix Table 4.4 in Mishra
(2004) . Apart from the fact that this would be considered the pre-eminent marker
of development, it is the best imaginable evidence that the Nehru-Mahalanobis
Strategy encompassed the Vakil-Brahmananda Plan which had predicated a wage-
goods constraint binding Indian economic growth.
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spectacular, and places in perspective the lingering grievance that
agriculture was ignored in comparison with the attention paid to
industrialisation in the Nehru-Maahalanobis Strategy. Indeed we need
to recognise the reversal of the retardation of the agricultural sector in
the first half of the twentieth century as one of the great achievements of
independent India, and this was entirely achieved in the Nehru era. I
submit this radically revised reading of the period.
IV.2   ‘The public sector enterprise as black hole’
The second misperception of the policies of the Nehru era pertains to
the idea of the public sector. In India today there is an unmistakable
frustration with the public sector. It is associated with a poor performance
record, resented for its lack of innovation, disdained for its contempt of
social responsibility and considered a draft on the public resources. On
the last, an additional consideration from further left, beyond the left-
wing parties often in power in some states, would be that it is financed
disproportionately by the poor who are not among its principal
beneficiaries. Much of this is not off the mark as a description of the true
state of affairs. However, the belief, among most, that this outcome is
intrinsic to the Nehruvian conception of the public sector is far from
correct. In this section I undertake two tasks. I first establish the rationale
for the setting up of a public sector in India. I then consider one indicator
of its performance during the Nehru era.
I choose to analyse the original idea of the public sector and its
performance record during the Nehru period within the overall project
of resource mobilization. This would not be considered unusual, for the
hallmark of any successful developmental effort is the mobilisation of
resources. It is not necessary that the resources mobilised must be
contained within the public sector. After all, private investment is an
equally legitimate component of aggregate investment in an economy.
However, in the context of Indian industrialisation, launched in the 1950s,
a large part of this mobilisation would necessarily have had to be in the
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public sector as it was intended that the state would have the leading role
here. For planning to be effective, there is required, if not a concentration
in its hands, at least an adequate82  fund base for the state. Where an
economy is at a low income level the requirement is likely to be large, in
turn requiring the productive surplus to come progressively into the public
sector thus enabling it to maintain command over resources83 . In this
section, I first present views on resource mobilisation and the role of the
public sector enterprises within that overall objective of both the
government and of independent economists then active. Subsequently, I
study the evidence on both resource mobilisation and the contribution
of the public sector to it.
As the Second Five-Year Plan constituted the single largest instance
of resource mobilisation during the Nehru era it’s documentation is likely
to be the best source of the government’s view on the question of interest
to us here. In the section titled ‘Financing’ of the ‘Recommendation for
the Second Five-Year Plan’ by the Planning Commission84  we find:
“Large financial resources would be required for the Second Plan. A
small portion would come from sterling balances or foreign loans and
aid; and the bulk of the resources must be found from within the economy.
The tax system would be directed to collect an increasing part of the
growing national income in order to permit greater capital formation in
the public sector and to finance an expansion of social services. The
public sector would be extended to industrial and commercial activities
where necessary for raising resources for public purposes.”85  This is
82. Oddly enough, while this is barely recognised by professional economists it is
widely recognised within civil society. See the report on a debate in Kerala
today in Mathrubhumi (2007).
83. A strong public-sector resource base is required also in high-income economies
with substantial welfare interventions, for instance, the economies of Western
Europe.
84. See Planning Commission (1956).
85. Planning Commission (1956), p. 27.
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echoed in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, which states that the
public sector was expected to “… augment the revenues of the state and
provide resources for further development in fresh fields”.86  We find
that the official idea of the public sector was not welfarist. In particular,
the idea of having a public sector at all was to raise resources for public
purposes. Of course, this is not inconsistent with a strong welfare
orientation. The issue point though is the role imagined for the public
sector when planned economic development was launched in India.
The need for very significant resource mobilisation and the role
of the public sector in relation to that task was also recognised by the
independent economists of the day. Emphasising that “ ... the effort
involved in this increase is considerable, and will strain the economy a
very great deal ….”, the economists empanelled by the Planning
Commission had spoken of “ … the great difficulty of increasing tax
proceeds unless a fundamental revision in current concepts that underlie
the tax system is accepted. One of these concepts relates to the exemption
of essentials from the scope of an important part of commodity taxation.
When so large a measure of effort is necessary to increase the proportion
of tax revenues to national income, which has remained so obstinately
static, one cannot escape the logic of the fact that the mass of consumption
is by the mass of the people. Unless this bears a somewhat higher burden
of taxation, no perceptible change in the stubborn ratio of public revenues
to national income can be achieved. We wish to endorse in particular,
the Recommendation of the Taxation Enquiry Commission to the effect
that Article 286(3) of the Constitution may be amended to remove the
present exemption of articles “essential to the life of the community”
from the scope of state sales taxation. Simultaneously, measures to secure
a practical ceiling on incomes through a steepening of taxes on income
and wealth, including estate duties, becomes an imperative necessity. A
revision of the price policy of important public enterprises with a view
86. Cited by Krishna (1988).
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to obtaining a larger surplus as a contribution to the resources for
economic development is similarly required. Besides the general increase
in rates of direct and indirect taxation that will be involved in the
considerable stepping up of tax effort will be part of the challenge to
administrative efficiency that the big development effort for putting
through the next Plan entails.”87  Apart from the replication of the views
of the government on the role of the public sector, quoted earlier, two
points may be noted. First, the independent economists had recognised
the serious resource mobilization effort  entailed in the plan to
industrialise. Secondly, note the complete absence of populism in the
recommendation that in the short-run even the convention of excluding
essentials from taxation may have to be put in abeyance. The unstated
expectation of the public sector are reflected in the government budget
proposed in the document ‘Recommendation for the Second Five-Year
Plan’. There, as I have pointed out once already, the profits from state
enterprises along with ‘additional taxes and loans’ exceed the amount of
foreign assistance88  allowed for and when combined with the
contribution from the Railways amounts to close to one eighth of the
total outlay. Finally, it is most instructive in the context to read
Mahalanobis: “In the highly developed countries of the West, taxes on
commodities are usually looked upon as “regressive”, as being a burden
on the poor. Public enterprises are also expected to be run on a no-loss-
no-profit basis. Fortunately, our outlook is changing and it is being
realised that in an underdeveloped country like India excise and customs
duties, purchase tax on commodities or a levy on services would be
convenient and adaptable methods to raise resources. It is also agreed in
principle that public enterprises should earn and contribute increasing
returns for purposes of national development.”89  One thing is clear from
87. From ‘The Second Five-year Plan: Basic considerations relating to the Plan
frame’, Memorandum prepared by the panel of economists constituted by the
Planning Commission, published in ‘Sankhya’ (1955), p. 115. Italics are mine.
88. See Mahalanobis (1964), p. 41.
89. Mahalanobis (1960), p. 97.
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these records of the time. Unlike today, populism was clearly treated
with contempt by the architects of economic policy in early independent
India.
While we may by now have an idea of the original conception of
the role of the public sector in India, we are yet to have a picture of its
performance. First, it may be repeated that a surge in public investment
had been achieved in the Nehru era, a fifteen-year record of expansion
that has not been surpassed. Secondly, the share of public savings in
Table 7 : Public sector savings (in current rupees crore)
    year public public public non- private
sector authorities departmental corporate
enterprises
50-51 168 159 9 89
51-52 252 243 9 132
52-53 145 129 16 60
53-54 127 107 20 86
54-55 151 126 25 114
55-56 172 145 27 130
56-57 231 193 38 151
57-58 245 195 50 117
58-59 227 170 57 136
59-60 236 176 60 180
60-61 425 362 63 276
61-62 494 426 68 315
62-63 566 480 86 338
63-64 709 586 123 387
64-65 817 679 138 381
Source:  Author’s estimates from National Accounts Statistics   1950-51
to 1987-88, Table 9, CSO
57
total savings had risen90  by the end of the period. Though the extent of
this increase is not much greater than that of the private corporate sector
it is still noteworthy that the expansion of investment was led by an
expansion of public saving, as was intended. We have in this an index of
the role of the public sector in resource mobilisation. Of course, this is
not an argument regarding the sufficiency of that mobilisation. While
yet on the topic, I present evidence on the behaviour of public sector
savings during the period that we are looking at here. In Table 7 are
presented data on savings of the public and private sectors. The public
sector has been classified further into the public authorities - comprising
government administration and departmental  commercial enterprises -
and the non-departmental enterprises - comprising government
companies and statutory corporations. Note from the Table that while
the expansion of savings in the public sector as a whole is as it is faster
than the expansion in savings of the private corporate sector, within the
former the non-departmental enterprises turn in a vastly superior
performance compared to all groups. Though the non-departmental
enterprises continue to improve steadily for the next twenty years or so,
during no other phase is the quite spectacular growth in their savings
during 1950-64 matched91 . Three caveats need be introduced, however.
First, the rise in aggregate profits is not incompatible with instances of
chronic loss-making by individual units. Secondly, the data cannot serve
as a measure of profitability for which purpose we would need to factor
in the volume of capital invested. And finally, this is not to be taken as a
mark of the efficiency of the public sector, as we are almost certainly
dealing with monopolies here.
Emerging from our discussion so far is a view of the public sector
held by the  leadership in the Nehru era that is entirely at odds with the
perception of that period. It has not been sufficiently well recognised
90.  See Rao and Sen (1985).
91.  See Table 3 in Rao and Sen (1995).
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that the public sector was originally conceived of as an active agent of
resource mobilization for development. Its transmigration into an flaccid
employment-granting welfarist agency was to come only after the death
of Nehru. For that very reason what we might today view with shock
horror the extraordinary record of public sector savings highlighted in
Table 4 is very likely to have been taken as comme il faut by Nehru
himself. Consider the following extract from a speech made on the
occasion of the inauguration of the second Hindustan Machine Tools
Factory at Bangalore in 1961: “There is a certain uniqueness about this
function and the factory. The uniqueness lies in the fact that this factory
has been made out of the profits or the surplus of the older Hindustan
Machine Tools factory and, rightly, therefore, it is called a gift to the
nation by those who have been working in the old factory. This should
be a matter of great satisfaction to all those who are concerned with the
HMT factory.”92  However, though the record of the public enterprises
during his time may have been seen as entirely appropriate the data
presented in Table 4 must challenge somewhat some economists of today.
Thus, referring to “the losses made by public enterprises”, Jagdish
Bhagwati has stated: “Capital-intensive white elephants in the public
sector were supported on the basis of models that deduced that this choice
of techniques would yield a higher savings rate and hence higher growth:
a conclusion that would now sound laughable, had its consequences not
been so tragic.”93  In the face of such strident commentary it is worth
repeating that during the Nehru era the savings of the public enterprises
actually grew faster than that of the private corporate sector.
92. From “A gift to the nation”, reprinted in ‘Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches 1957-
1963’, Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, GoI.
Interestingly, Nehru was not squeamish about acknowledging assistance from
the West when he felt it necessary to do so. For the speech continues: “May I
also refer to those who originally set up the plant here, the well-known Swiss
firm of Oerlikons who laid the foundations? They built the first HMT plant and
helped in training our people in the early stages, and their work has yielded this
fine result.”
93. Bhagwati (1998), pp. 6-7.
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Neither the official approach to them nor the actual record of the
public enterprises during these years suggests that the public sector was
one of the wasteful  legacies of the Nehru era. Their drift in this direction
owes more to the pure politics of a subsequent era when the public sector
was turned into a vast machine for dispensing patronage and buying out
politically the vested interests of the day. The evidence presented here
also allows us to evaluate the assertion that dirigisme is recipe for a
fiscal crisis of the state94 . The growth of the central government’s tax
revenues, as share of GDP, in the fifteen years since 1950 had not been
exceeded95  even by the year 2000. However, my aim here has been to
establish that the public sector was a strategic intervention in the cause
of growth, and that during the Nehru era it had delivered to a reasonable
extent.
V.3 ‘ A model that could never have’
There exists a strong body of opinion that directly links the relatively
low growth recorded in India over the long haul to the flawed Nehruvian
‘model’. Though it has already been established in this paper that the
record of growth in the Nehru era is hardly disappointing, and we know
that some of the narrative is intended as caricature96 , this view needs to
be addressed as it is often encountered. I shall consider criticisms from
two angles, each representative of a view of what constituted the core of
public policy in the Nehru era.
The first of the lines of criticism draws not so much on mainstream
economics as on political philosophy, and perhaps precisely for that
reason is more widely held. This line of criticism identifies state
intervention as having stifled private enterprise. Add to this “a loss-
94. See ‘Introduction’ in Lal (1999).
95. See ‘Public Finance Statistics 2004-5’, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi:
Government of India.
96. See Bhagwati (1998) for the description ‘model for going backwards’.
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making public sector” and we have a strategy that far from mobilizing
resources needed for development actually squandered them. The view
is neatly summarized by Chibber thus: “ … India’s mistake was its very
turn toward development planning in the first place, an economic strategy
that relied so centrally on state intervention in markets.”97   Of course, in
some spaces of the economy the loss of economic freedom due to state
intervention in the Nehru era was indeed real. But it is important to have
a measure of its extent. Prominent among the restrictions, and emblematic
of the restriction of freedom of enterprise was industrial licencing.
Instituted with a view to channeling resources according to plan priorities,
industrial licencing did seriously limit the freedom to invest (including
in capacity expansion) of the private sector. Moreover, even apart from
defence and atomic energy - in which areas it is likely to have little
interest in investing – private investment was mostly excluded from the
utilities and much of infrastructure. However, the area over which
licencing had had an impact must be seen in perspective. It was confined
almost entirely to manufacturing, leaving out of its purview about 80
percent of the economy in the 1950s. Agriculture was a notable area of
exclusion as it was the largest part of the economy. In addition to licencing
there was reservation, with certain sectors – chosen mainly on grounds
of their being ‘traditional’ – reserved for industrial units with capital
investment less than a prescribed limit. In the language of a strand of
development economics such intervention was ‘distortionary’ in that it
would cause deviations from the market outcome. However, in a perverse
sense the same intervention may be read as expanding (or ‘protecting’
as one’s perception may dictate) the economic freedom of the
beneficiaries of the reservation who in its absence may have been
competed out altogether. So, to be precise, the reservation policy had
limited the freedoms of the private corporate sector. The policy of
reserving certain segments of the manufacturing sector for small units
97. Chibber (2003), p. 6. The author himself does not subscribe to this view, however.
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would have had the obvious impact of not allowing for any potential
economies of sale to be reaped in these sectors. Among its consequences,
it has been alleged, has been the destruction of India’s more automated
cotton textile industry which now had to face competition from a
handloom sector itself protected from competition by the reservation
policy.
The perception of a loss of economic freedom during the Nehru
era is closely linked to the presence of controls. Further, whether by
design or default much of these controls came to be referred to as
‘socialism’. What is, however, interesting is that a large part of this
structure had been instituted during the Second World War. Put in place
by a colonial government guided not solely by the objective of protecting
India but also of ensuring that finance and resources flow in a direction
compatible with maintaining the Allied war effort globally, these controls
encompassed economic activity from foreign trade, to capital issue, prices
and even the internal movement of goods, notably grain. The origins
and development of much of the controls in post-Independence India
have been traced to the first half of the nineteen forties by Mohan and
Agarwal (1990). Even the urban bias of the public distribution system
can be traced to the colonial government’s need to maintain the peace
needed to continue the outward-oriented war effort. Two instances clarify
the precise relationship of these controls to the Mahalanobis strategy.
First, the debate at the time of the launching of the Second Five-Year
Plan model was about the maintenance of the war-time controls and not
the institution of a new set. Thus it was that B.R. Shenoy’s note of
dissent98  had actually argued for its rescinding; there had been no
proposal for a significant increase in controls as part of the Mahalanobis
strategy, perhaps because the powers with the government since the War
left it with sufficient clout to control economic activity. In particular the
import controls came to evolve in an ad hoc manner after a balance of
98. See Shenoy (1955).
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payments crisis, itself precipitated by subsequent liberalization,
interestingly, of consumer goods99  imports. Licencing, of course, did
figure prominently in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 providing
the legislative muscle for the actualisation of planning for growth.
I conclude this discussion of the place and role of controls in the
Nehru era with two observations. First, despite the allegedly debilitating
impact of controls the economy did recover from almost half a century
of stagnation. Moreover, it was the manufacturing sector - the area of
the economy most subject to controls - that had recorded the fastest
growth. Secondly, and this anticipates a theme in my overall conclusion
on the nature and role of public policy in the Nehru era, there is a need
to distinguish the economic policy of this period from what was yet to
emerge. What we now recognize as the major distinguishing features of
the policy regime of India since Independence were to come later. I have
in mind the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act
and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), an astronomical
marginal rate of taxation of income, the nationalisation of banks and the
legislation100  that has come to be known as ‘labour laws’ all together
providing a happy hunting ground and a rich source of rent for an
increasingly unregulated bureacracy. Most of this has been draconian
and little of it has served the upliftment of India’s poor, but it is worth
recalling that all of this had come after the death of Nehru. Indeed, that
some of it was to follow that event very closely is itself indicative of the
Nehru’s own attitude to many of these interventions.
The second angle from which the Nehruvian strategy is criticized
targets what we would more readily recognize as an economic model
than merely a contingent loss of economic freedoms. This critique is a
little more fleshed out than the first, and based a little more on empirical
99. See Chibber (2003).
100 . Of course, legislation governing work and employment in the factories date
from the colonial era.
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reasoning, though I shall have occasion to point out that this can lead the
argument to unexpected conclusions including that of validating the
choice of model in the first place. It proceeds by arguing that the model
of import-subtituting industrialization (ISI) that India had followed was
unlikely to have done any better that it actually did in the long run, and
that India’s mistake was to have chosen this model over one of greater
outward orientation with a central role for trade. Even though the critique
of ISI was that protection induced high-cost production this by itself
was not enough to disqualify such a model from the perspective of growth,
for these is no particular reason to insist that growth will be necessarily
slower within such a system. So reference was now made to historical
experience. By the late seventies the larger and more prominent
developing economies that had adopted ISI had begun to appear stuck
in a groove of slow growth. On the other hand, the economies of East
Asia, namely Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore had all arrived on
the global stage as leading exporters and were also the fastest growing
economies of the world. From this was born the idea of an export-led
growth, and the ISI model was written off completely as a non-starter.
Proceeding from the poor record of exports of the countries, India
included, that had promoted ISI it was concluded that interventionism
was responsible for the disappointing outcome. As I shall demonstrate,
this conclusion was somewhat premature. Answers to two issues need to
be sorted out first. These pertain to competitiveness and causality. While
it is no more than a matter of accounting that fast-growing exports will
raise the rate of growth of an economy, it has been recognised that the
causality between growth and exports is not strictly of the kind usually
presumed by arguments for an export–led growth. For instance, where
dynamic economies of scale are to be reaped a faster economy-wide
growth leads to faster productivity growth in all sectors and this enhances
the international competitiveness of an economy’s exports. Now the
causality is directly from growth to exports and not from exports to
growth. However, not all cases of international competitiveness can be
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attained thus, and for many of the far-eastern economies the domestic
market was much too small to depend upon for faster growth to bring
abut a greater international competitiveness. Here a competitiveness was
developed, and the question remains how. While protection is
fundamental, the rationale being no more than the century-old ‘infant
industry’ argument of List, it is clear that it is far from sufficient to explain
the attainment of this competitiveness. The work of Alice Amsden has
helped us understand how this has been done in these other economies
of the Far East which unlike Japan in the interwar years or China today
actually entered markets for fairly sophisticated manufactures especially
electronics. Combined with the work of Wade this has led to a “significant
re-thinking in development studies”101  of the strategy of growth to be
pursued by the underdeveloped economies of he world. Their work has
conclusively established the role of ISI in general and intervention in
particular as having laid the base of the East Asian success. No longer
are we satisfied with hoary accounts of free trade, export-led growth
and merely ‘market-friendly’ governments that only dealt at arms length
from private agents.
Bruce Scott (1997) has investigated the historical basis for the
claim that the successful economies of the world had abjured intervention,
or state directedness, and adhered to free trade. Scott has studied two
historical episodes, one less often encountered in development economics
today. The first episode is that of the well-known East Asian experience,
and his comment is as follows: “Taiwan and South Korea …. now have
relatively free economies. In earlier decades, these countries did have
some economic freedoms, notably in product markets. But both were
authoritarian regimes with non-transparent controls aimed at
simultaneously promoting exports and restricting foreign entry into their
economies. The state-owned banking system in South Korea allowed
the chaebol conglomerates to develop rapidly with little retained equity,
101.  Chibber (2003).
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much like the Japanese keiretsu in the early 1950s. South Korea’s leaders
chose to develop the economy by concentrating their efforts on a small
number of large companies, which they protected by eliminating the
market for corporate control. They also established labour laws that all
but eliminated workers’ ability to bargain collectively, thereby ensuring
that companies would have the lion’s share of income in order to promote
development. Taiwan used purchasing policies of state-owned enterprises
for similar purposes. Only in recent years, as their economies achieved a
high degree of success, have Taiwan’s and South Korea’s governments
begun to relax their grip.”102   Though accounts of the East Asian
experience, including of the associated role of government, abound103  I
have chosen  this one for its particular clarity. But Scott’s contribution to
the debate on ‘economic freedom’ was to come in taking on the argument
in the context of the historical experience of the first industrial country,
referred to in the context as Great Britain. Addressing the claim that it
had gained economic supremacy in the 19th century when it moved to a
free trade regime he has argued: “But its rise took place mainly in the
previous century, when in competition with France and the Netherlands,
it relied on a protectionist policy of trade promotion and on forced
mobilization of resources. Great Britain dismantled its trade regime after
it became the undisputed economic, financial, and industrial leader of
the world, not before. Under its new, freer policies it began its relative
economic decline and was slow to take advantage of the newer industries
based on electrical and chemical engineering. For all its freedoms, it had
performed below average for industrial countries for more than a century
– and especially since World War II – as its incomes have fallen below
those in most of the rest of Western Europe.
It is true that Great Britain began its initial rise to supremacy by
freeing up its internal market, a step it took while other sizeable countries
102.  Scott (1997), p. 159.
103. See in particular Chang (2003).
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were divided into regions with their own trade barriers. The Great Britain
of the 18th century had the largest domestic market in Europe even though
it population was less than half of France’s, and that market encouraged
a great deal of economic innovation and resourcefulness. The United
States followed the same pattern during its ascendance: it combined a
free domestic market with sizeable tariff barriers until after World War
II. Indeed all the leading industrial powers developed as protectionist
regimes in the 19th century, whereas countries such as India and Portugal,
following free trade regimes, found themselves stripped of industry.”104
However, it is Scott’s observation on contemporary China that
serves most to query the privileging of economic freedom as a driver of
economic growth, and that has the greatest potential of sorting out
ideological predilection from economics. Scott observes: “With almost
twenty consecutive years of growth exceeding 5 percent per capita per
year, China already seems to be demonstrating that the lives of 1.2 billion
people can be radically improved in an environment that sharply limits
freedom.”105   In the context of the debate on the best ‘model’ for growth
this example has an interesting  implication. It shows that selecting the
model that ought to have been chosen in the past using the criterion of
current growth rates can be treacherous for those committed to a narrow
vision of economic freedom. For, if, on the basis of current growth rates,
China’s is to judged the right choice of development model it must
logically follow that India’s mistake was not in having chosen the
Mahalanobis model but in not taking it far enough in investing in heavy
industry and sealing itself off from the rest of the world in the 1950s.
Indeed in some remarkably prescient writing done over three decades
ago, at a time when China’s rise to economic power status was yet to
have been imagined, Byres and Nolan (1976) had concluded that: “…
China has progressed towards industrialisation at a faster rate than India
104. Ibid, p. 159.
105. Ibid., p. 159.
67
and appears to be poised for an even faster pace of industrial advance
than India in the future.” The basis for their prognosis is: “… the greater
emphasis given by China to the development of ‘key’ industries places
her in a better position for future economic development, since it has
freed her to a greater extent than India from the foreign exchange
constraint over the rate of investment and growth. China now appears to
have a significantly greater capability than India to produce domestically
the ‘producer’ goods that are the physical wherewithal of investment.”
Interestingly, in the context of the general distrust of planning as an
unneccesary interference in the market mechanism Byres and Nolan state
that China’s superior performance is due to the “quality and effectiveness
of planning” in that country compared with that attempted in India. It is
possible to recognise their forecast as an instance of extraordinary
economic intuition even as one may disagree outright with their assertion
that China had attained whatever it had “without the terrible cost in human
suffering” that has characterised the Indian experience. Though weighing-
up deprivations one against the other is like comparing apples and
oranges, one might yet argue that it is not credible to assert that the costs
of political repression, and the alleged death by starvation following
economic adventurism, in China amount to less than that of the chronic
hunger in India. Silence on the political repression would have been
inexcusable even at a time when information was scarce and the political
leadership had yet to start implementing the ‘one child per couple’ policy
by forcing third-trimester abortions for accounts of the excesses of the
Cultural Revolution had begun to filter through by the early seventies.
What emerges from our discussion can be concisely summarised
thus: While it can hardly be denied that markets are fundamental to
sustained growth it would be naïve to dismiss governments as dispensable
to the outcome. Indeed that would be a misreading of a by now richly
documented history of economic growth in diverse settings and across
centuries. Even without insisting that government is the driver of growth,
diverse experiences of economic growth and development show us that
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government is an economic driver in the sense that its actions can have
majorly beneficial consequences.
With so much historical experience of success using a model of
ISI it is difficult to walk  away insisting that the choice of model per se
explains India’s relatively slow growth for about two decades from the
mid-sixties. The answer must be sought in the domestic political
economy, the balance of economic and political forces that determine
economic outcomes, and the nature of the Indian state106 . Following
the work of Wade (1990) on Korea we are able to see that in India the
government singularly failed to govern the market. Nevertheless, as I
have shown, the record growth in the Nehru era was far from what tends
to get assumed or suggested.
While the discussion in this section may have served to dispel the
perception that policy in the Nehru era had neglected the crucial role of
agriculture or even the savings potential of the public sector enterprises
and that it was based on an economic model that stood no chance of
success, there is one area that appears to have been neglected very severely
then. And this is primary education. Rare are the interventions from
contemporary Indian economists on the relevance of primary education,
but there is a particularly forceful one by Krishnamurti107 , an economist
then with the Bombay School. In 1955, within months of the publication
of the ‘Recommendation for the Second Five-Year Plan’ brought out by
the Planning Commission, Krishnamurti was writing “… how absurdly
low are the sums allotted for education in the Mahalanobis Plan.”,
speaking of it as being lop-sided, with little importance given to education
and other social services, and calling for a re-allocation to expenditure
on this account from the outlay on heavy industries. More important are
106 Such explanations have been provided by Chibber (2003) and Kohli (2004),
respectively.
107 See ‘Krishnamurti’ in Balasubramanyan (2001). I am indebted to Ramachandra
Guha who brought this extraordinary document to my attention.
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Krishnamurti’s reasons for a greater expenditure on education and
interesting is his explanation for why it is so low. “A concerted effort to
educate the mass of the population, specially in the rural areas, would
undoubtedly have far-reaching benefits of a cumulative expansionist
character. This would greatly lighten the task of the government in
bringing about rapid economic development.” Pointing to the
government’s lack of even-handedness in dealing with education in
comparison with “heavy industries or river valley projects” for which it
was willing to adopt deficit financing, he speculates whether this has to
do with the fact that “being brought up in the traditions of mid-Victorian
finance” it continues to “apply the calculus of the private grocery
merchant to a matter like education.”108
Interestingly, in all the counterfactual scenarios that are sketched
for India it is openness to trade that tends to get emphasised, the implicit
suggestion being that the possibilities of trade were neglected. There
may well be a point to this observation, at least surely for the period
starting the early sixties. However, the absence of primary education
from these exercises of counterfactual analysis is striking. One cannot
overlook the likelihood that the very face of India, not to mention the
rate of growth of output via human capital accretion, may have been
vastly different had much more attention been paid to primary education
at the very outset. As this study is also an evaluation of the contribution
of Nehru to the growth and transformation of India, I am reminded of
the comment made to me by a civil servant in Bangalore that the man
whose birthday is celebrated as Children’s Day in India had actually
managed to do very little for her very young. Cruel as it may sound, and
appearing as outrageous given Nehru’s known  empathy with children,
the verdict is very close for it is indeed correct that primary education
was severely neglected in the Nehru era. It is of course technically true
that, given the constitutional distribution of powers in India, Education
108.  All quotations are from ‘Krishnamurti’ in Balasubramanyan (2001).
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– being a ‘State Subject’ - was then at least partially a responsibility of
the states, but this does not absolve the policy maker of the Nehru era of
a grave error of judgment regarding the factors that drive growth, leave
alone development. Of course, even into the twentyfirst century, we
continue to neglect the continued neglect of primary education.
VI.  Conclusion
The public policy of the Nehru era had set in motion a more or less
stagnant colonial economy. A proliferating bureaucracy, corruption,
closedness to foreign capital and the consequent technological
backwardness in production, the lack of competition and the consequent
shoddiness of the consumer goods, an unaccountable public sector and
the consequent low productivity all, perhaps unintendedly but surely
tragically, ‘came along’, so to speak. But it cannot be denied that the
economy had been got moving, and in any case specific policies were
open to correction. A course-correction could well have been applied,
but it was not. Instead, after the death of Nehru, was witnessed what has
been described as a ‘lurch to the left’ characterised by increasing trade
and industrial policy controls and at times reckless expansion of public-
sector employment. What precise role these policies had in shoring up
the post-Nehru political establishment remains to be analysed. To attempt
to answer this would take me far from the objective of this essay, but
there exist accounts by political scientists109 . However, one thing is clear.
Many of these policies were at a tangent from those of the Nehru era,
notably the deteriorating performance of the public sector and the use of
public monies to buy out economic disaffection with subsidies. This
came to be termed ‘Nehruvian socialism’ even though the elimination
of economic waste, unaccountable governance and inefficiency of
resource use were the very arguments for socialism in the first place,
and not just in India. But more to the point, no matter that all of it bore
109. See Hankla (2006). For a less theory-laden but historically richer, in that it is
related to specific events, account see Chandra, Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2000).
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no resemblance to what had been practiced in the Nehru era. It’s
consequences were serious for India. As Chandra, Mukherjee and
Mukherjee (2000) have commented: “The controls, restrictions,
interventions …. were paradoxically often resorted to in the name of
introducing ‘socialist’ principles and equity but actually ended up building
a distorted, backward capitalism …. .”110   From the point of view of
understanding the past, Desai’s comment “Today when people criticise
the Nehruvian model, little do they know that it began with the daughter,
and not the man himself.”111  is apt. While it was a disappointing end to
a high-minded journey, it is important to place the outcome in proper
perspective when we evaluate the Nehru-Mahalanobis Strategy.
I would hope that this paper restores some perspective to the recent
economic history of India. The Nehru era witnessed the recovery of
India and the igniting of a growth process that has remained undimmed
for over five decades, during which time the economy has been hastening
slowly. The repeated acceleration of the growth rate implies that drawing
a likeness between the policies of the Nehru era and the Soviet Union is
false as growth in India has been sustained in a way that it was not in the
Former Soviet Union. Actually, India’s growth rate has accelerated and
it may be suggested that this is not incompatible with the Nehru-
Mahalanobis Strategy.Within the recovery engineered I have flagged
two specific achievements of the Nehru era: the quite spectacular
transformation of agriculture as reflected in the acceleration of production
and the unprecedented mobilisation of resources by the Indian state as
reflected in the hike in public investment. There have been errors of
commission, such as the proliferation of an unregulated economic
bureaucracy, and of omission, such as the gross neglect of primary
education. But there have been four decades after Nehru to correct these.
110 Chandra, Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2000), p. 359.
111 Desai (2007), p. 40. See also the distinction ‘Nehru versus Nehruites’ drawn by
Dhar (1989).
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To suggest that this is due to a ‘lock-in’112  effect of the Nehruvian strategy
and that nothing could have been done to alter the situation is only to
confirm that we have not understood the lessons of our recent past.
This paper has studied economic growth in the Nehru era. The
picture that has emerged has a bearing on two unrelated questions. The
first is a generic one of perennial interest to economists, the role of
government in economic growth. The second is the historical role of
Jawaharlal Nehru with respect to the Indian economy in general, and
long-term growth in particular. I deal with these together in what remains
of this concluding section.
Even though I have not focused on the particular role of Jawaharlal
Nehru in the formulation and implementation of the economic policy of
his time, I have here, however, presented an account of his views on the
economy including, to an extent, of their evolution. Arguably, no Indian
leader since at the helm of this country has been as crucial to the
navigation of its economy. The economic record of this time serves as
one important indicator of the effectiveness of his role. Under Jawaharlal
Nehru the Indian economy had been transformed from a colonial enclave
to one with at least some of the prerequisites for sustained long-term
growth while at the same time maintaining an autonomy from the
superpowers vying for influence on a newly independent sub-continent.
As a particular icon of this transformation we may consider the rate of
growth achieved in the Nehru years. I have provided both historical and
comparative perspective on this variable and argued that the achievement
was indeed remarkable. The framework within which it had been achieved
reflects upon today’s thinking on the ideal economic architecture for
growth. Central to this purported ideal is the construct of economic
freedom, defined as absence of restraint. Considered ‘Economics’ since
the implosion of the Soviet Union, this idea is sharply at odds with the
112. Chibber (2003).
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recent history of China where the longest ever recorded boom is occurring
in an environment that severely113  restricts freedoms. While the situation
in the Nehru era was a far cry from contemporary China, both in terms
of economic and political freedoms, the growth performance of that
period engineered almost entirely by the state is a serious challenge to
the thinking on growth encapsulated in the Washington Consensus, a
recipe for prosperity highly influential in the nineties but by now114
under challenge.
By implication, this study has also provided an evaluation of the
historical role of Jawaharlal Nehru albeit in a limited sphere, the economy.
As I have mentioned, this exercise is not itself of only limited interest
though, as even the most authoritative appraisals of the man tend to
dwell less on his role as an economic architect. But I am aware of my
appraisal being radically at odds with broader evaluations of the man
from across the political spectrum. I shall present the briefest possible
accounts of what I consider a representative set. The first is that of Hiren
Mukerjee, a close contemporary of Nehru’s, a lawyer and a member of
the Communist Party of India. Author of an affectionate portrait of Nehru
as a ‘gentle colossus’, published in the year of Nehru’s death, Mukerjee
had had the following to say: “But for him, India would have felt much
less the winds of change that had been blowing over the world; he made
us aware of them and also more receptive. Yet he failed his people in so
far as he could not adequately execute the great mandate he had from
them because he just was not relentless enough. He was our beautiful
but ineffectual angel, beating his beautiful wings largely in vain.”115
The second view of Nehru that I wish to present here comes from India’s
far right. The RSS leader K.S. Sudarshan speaking in New Jersey in
113. Labour has limited rights of geographical mobility and none of trade-union
mobilisation in China.
114. See Rodrik (2006).
115. Mukerjee (1964), p. 223-4.
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2005 has said: “We hoped that things would change after the (sic) Indian
Independence …. but that did not happen. Nehru was the last Britisher
to have ruled India, therefore nothing at all changed.”116  While
Sudarshan’s concerns in the speech are mostly focused on culture, it
does suggest that little changed in India under Nehru. Only rank ignorance
would lead one to equate the colonial and early post-colonial economies
of India. Finally, I quote someone who by his sympathies and intellectual
reach would be deemed a ‘global Indian’.  An enthusiast for the reforms
of 1991, some have seen him as a spokesman for India’s corporate sector,
but it is apparent from his writings that Gurcharan Das is nevertheless
deeply concerned of the well-being of his compatriots. He has argued
that: “… Jawaharlal Nehru and his planners attempted an industrial
revolution through the agency of the state.  They did not trust the private
entrepreneurs, so they made the state the entrepreneur. Not surprisingly,
they failed, and India is still paying a high price for their follies.”117  We
have here a conspectus of views on Jawaharlal Nehru covering a wide
angle. I believe that in the light of my account of the growth of the
Indian economy in the Nehru era they appear without credibility. On the
other hand, the estimate of Nehru by his partner in the charting of India’s
economic journey compels our attention. For a statistician, likely to have
been alert to the need for weighing-up of probabilities, Mahalanobis’s
forecast for the economy, made in the late fifties, is markedly free of
confidence intervals! He had remarked: “One thing can be said with
complete certainty. Whether there is a smooth transition or whether India
has to pass through storms on her way to progress, it will be impossible
to go back to a stagnant economy.  Through his leadership, he has brought
about profound changes in social and productive forces which will
continue to influence the course of events in India in the most decisive
way.”118  This forecast has accredited itself. It must encourage us to begin
116. Sudarshan (2005).
117. Das (2000).
118. Mahalanobis (1960), p. 563.
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to view the recovery achieved by the policies of the period as a bridgehead
to the higher growth rates that have followed. The shibboleth ‘Hindu
rate of growth’, presumably a broad-brush description of movement in
this period, manages to obscure the extraordinary economic dynamics
of the Nehru era.
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